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Abstract       
The „activation‟ of labour market policies is a relatively undisputed phenomenon 
in the concomitant research field. However, welfare regime scholars predict the 
importance of path dependence in different advanced welfare states‟ policy 
responses to the ever-present problem of mass youth unemployment. The aim of 
this thesis is to explore the trajectories of youth unemployment policy in Sweden, 
the UK and France between 1990-2014 in order to determine whether there has 
been a convergence of policy across different welfare regime types. Using process 
tracing and motivation analysis methods, the parliamentary debates surrounding 
four major youth employment programmes are analysed through the juxtapose 
perspectives of youth transition regime theory and policy convergence theory. The 
indicators of policy change detected through these case studies are classified 
under ideational, organizational and financial dimensions developed by 
Weishaupt (2011). The results of the comparative analysis of the three countries 
suggest that the youth transition regime legacy in the overarching goals and 
purposes of policy choices is a strong determinant for policy choice; that patterns 
of convergence are strongest with regards to subsidization of non-public 
employers and the expenditures on active labour market measures.  
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1 Introduction 
Since the early nineties, many European welfare states have suffered from 
endemically high youth unemployment rates, despite economic fluctuations or 
Left/Right-wing governments (Eurostat, 2015; Weishaupt, 2011). Since different 
waves of financial crises have struck Europe from the 1970s until the present 
day, affecting society as a whole but not the least vulnerable groups on the 
labour market, even the most advanced welfare states in Western Europe have 
been obliged to fashion new policy tools and strategies to come to terms with 
rising youth unemployment (Johansson, 2001; Lødemel – Trickey, 2000; Kildal, 
2001; Ladi – Graziano, 2014). Countries such as Sweden, with traditionally high 
levels of decommodification
1
, Universalistic approaches to social protection and 
generous social policies for groups exposed to the risk of unemployment and 
poverty, have incorporated new and more neo-liberal measures in their labour 
market policies  (Johansson, 2001; Kildal, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1990). This 
repositioning often entails weakened benefit systems, higher conditionality for 
benefit entitlement and more demands on the activation of the young jobseekers 
(Clasen – Clegg, 2011). Many scholars suggest, thus, that this “activation” trend 
has permeated most national youth unemployment policies in Western Europe 
(Weishaupt, 2011; Johansson, 2001; Lindsay – Mailand, 2004).  It is taking 
place not only in the Nordic countries, as attempts to ameliorate the employment 
rates and to solve the socio-economic issues that follow the transformation to a 
post-industrial society, but in most advanced welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, 1999).  
     Meanwhile, numerous initiatives within the European Union (EU), such as 
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 “A minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general 
welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 23). 
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the European Employment Strategy
2
 (EES) (Goetschy, 1999) and the Youth 
Guarantee, have been launched to tackle mass youth unemployment over the 
course of the past twenty-five years, and to address labour market issues on 
national levels through inter-governmental strategies, goals and funding 
(Lahusen et al., 2013; Eichorst et al, 2013). With pressure and influence coming 
from external as well as internal actors and institutions, the conceptualization of 
the youth unemployment problem at the national level is constantly debated and 
recast. As opposed to the „path dependency‟ concept inherited in welfare regime 
theory (Rothstein-Steinmo, 2002, pp. 95-97), some scholars view the increased 
globalisation as convergence pressure that over time will streamline policies 
across different welfare regimes (Drezner, 2001; Bennett, 1991). The changing 
political landscape throughout Europe, with liberalisation and globalisation of 
the economy as well as international interdependence, prompts the question of 
what lies ahead for labour market policy in the modern welfare state? What 
direction is staked out in the battle against the continuously high youth 
unemployment, and could it be that the ideas for policy formation in this area are 
becoming more and more similar across different welfare states? Departing from 
these questions, I begin my path towards understanding the patterns of youth 
unemployment policy formation; where it has been, where it is, and where it 
might be headed.     
1.1 Statement of purpose 
Since the mid-1980s, governments have faced many possible policy paths in the 
quest to combat these periodically peaking and continuously high youth 
unemployment rates. With both internal and external political forces affecting 
the policy discussion and the policy options available to choose from, the policy 
outcomes are constituted by a mixture of influences, ideas and forces. My 
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 ”The European employment strategy (EES) was introduced in 1992 by the Treaty of the European Union and 
since then has been the cornerstone of the EU‟s employment policy. Its main aim is the creation of more and 
better jobs throughout the EU.” (European Commission, 2015). 
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intention is to closely examine the policies and the motives behind these policies 
that different welfare states have used to combat youth unemployment between 
1990-2014. In order to understand the course that the labour market policies in 
Western Europe have taken over the past two-and-a-half decade, I choose three 
countries that in the welfare policy literature are classified as adhering to 
different welfare regime types with different youth transition regimes (Walther, 
2006; Esping-Andersen, 1999; McNeish – Loncle, 2006). The countries I have 
chosen for this purpose are Sweden (Universalistic regime type), the United 
Kingdom (UK) (Liberal regime type) and France (Employment-centred regime 
type) (Esping-Andersen, 1999; McNeish – Loncle, 2006).   
     All three countries have experienced economic austerity with sharp increases 
in the youth unemployment as well as structural barriers confounding the 
readjustment of the unemployment rates, but at different points in time. With the 
similar exposure to and experience of mass youth unemployment, my approach 
to the comparison is through the country-specific perception of the problem and 
the context in which this perception took place, rather than the particular place in 
time (Kingdon, 2011). I mean to shed light on the three countries‟ particular 
policy trajectories in order to discern the similarities and differences in a 
comparative analysis. This will provide a better insight of the rationale through 
which different welfare states operate on the youth unemployment policy issues.  
1.2 Research question 
The research question that I aim to answer is: 
 
- To what extent have Sweden, the UK and France’s governments’ formation of 
programmes targeting youth unemployment converged or diverged between 
1990-2014? 
 
In order to answer this question, I aim to study key policymakers‟ motives used 
to justify a certain policy or labour market tool, along with the actual policy 
change so that convergence or divergence tendencies can be detected and 
  4 
measured. As I deliberate on further in chapter 3, I use different theoretical 
vantage points that serve both to understand patterns of divergence, which would 
support ideas of path dependency of youth transition regime legacies, and 
convergence, which in turn would support the predictions of convergence 
theory; idea proliferation and policy harmonization. The choice of three different 
welfare states for comparison enables me to exploit their specificities to 
strengthen the validity of my conclusions and caters to an interesting analysis 
and conclusion about the path of the labour market policy in welfare regimes.   
1.3 Structure of thesis 
In the following, I begin by giving an overview of the subject of youth 
unemployment, its changing nature over time and how it is understood in the 
literature. I also elaborate on the different policy options available to target this 
group and explain how my research fits in to the greater body of youth 
transitioning literature. In chapter 3, I lay the theoretical foundation necessary to 
capture the relevant features and flows of changes in youth unemployment 
policy and formulate hypotheses drawing on mainly youth transition regime 
theory and policy convergence theory. I account for methodological 
considerations and the operationalization of the theory through the channels of 
process tracing and motivation analysis in chapter 4. In chapter 5, I move to 
present and analyse the central policymakers‟ motives in four major youth 
employment programmes within the country contexts. In the concluding 
chapters 6 and 7, I carry out a comparative discussion of the results from the 
country analyses, highlighting the main findings and draw conclusions.  
  5 
2 Youth unemployment in modern 
welfare states 
In this chapter, I provide a short discussion of the definitions of youth 
unemployment and give an overview to the issue of youth unemployment in the 
context of the modern welfare state. I elaborate on how the issue and its 
underlying factors have been discussed in the literature and the different policy 
tools employed by policymakers to facilitate transition from school to work for 
the young and to decrease youth unemployment.  
2.1 Definitions of youth unemployment 
 
The generic definition of youth unemployment, applied by the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) as well as the EU, is a person between 15-24 years of age 
that is not in employment (Eurostat, 2015a) irrespective of whether that person is 
enrolled in an upper secondary or tertiary educational programme. A country‟s 
response to high rates of youth unemployment can thus be expected to hinge, to 
some extent, on the level of enrolment in higher education (Ziegler et al, 2015, 
pp. 5-7). Many scholars have begun to employ the concept of young people „Not 
in Employment, Education or Training‟ (NEETs) as an integrated category in the 
youth unemployment measures, for the purpose of discerning the specific 
challenges that different countries and governments face on the issue (Eurofund, 
2014, pp. 5-7; Ryan, 2001; Rosenbaum et al, 1990). 
     Across the globe, in developed as well developing countries, youth 
unemployment is not only a financial challenge for the social assistance system 
and a risk of social exclusion for the young, but it also poses a threat to future 
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public health results and political stability at large (Kieselbach, 2003, pp. 47-50; 
Ziegler et al, 2015, pp. 3-10; du Bois-Reymond – López Blasco, 2003, pp. 19-
22). Whereas regular unemployment, the type of unemployment that concerns 
individuals that are over 25 years of age, presupposes some sort of work 
experience preceding the unemployment spell (Trickey – Lødemel, 2011; Clasen 
– Clegg, 2011), the main characteristic of youth unemployment is the lack of 
work experience, possibly in combination with the lack of adequate or 
appropriate education. In the following sections of this thesis, these are the 
definitions and the understanding of youth unemployment that my approach to 
the research problem leans on. 
2.2 The shifting landscape of employment studies 
Numerous scholars of welfare and employment policies have studied the 
activation trend, ‟from welfare to workfare‟, in different country settings and 
country-clusters (Nordic, Continental and Anglo-American or, correspondingly, 
Social-Democrat, Employment-centred and Liberal welfare systems) 
(Weishaupt, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Johansson, 2001; Lødemel – 
Trickey, 2000; Walther, 2006). Within this strand of labour market research 
there is little disagreement over the fundamental impact that the ERM crisis in 
the early 1990s has had on the unemployment rates in Europe in general, and the 
severe effects on youth unemployment levels in particular (Johansson, 2001; 
Kildal, 2001; Martin, 2000; Caliendo et al, 2011).  
     Many scholars talk about an increase in inequality in Western European 
states (Emmenegger et al, 2012, pp. 5-10; Whitfield, 2001; Rueda, 2006). The 
changing face of the labour market structure and labour market policies are both 
work drivers and consequences of the retrenchment of generous social policies at 
large and shifts away from the comprehensive and Universalistic welfare state as 
an ideal (Emmenegger et al, 2012). The consequences that this transformation 
has had for the labour market across different European welfare regimes are the 
widened wage dispersion, the flexibilization of labour contracts and the increase 
in atypical contracts such as fixed-term, part-time or at-will contracts (Ibid). The 
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broader term that this development has been given by scholars of labour market 
policy change and regimes is „dualization‟, meaning the creation of insiders and 
outsiders on the labour market (Emmenegger et al, 2012; Häusermann – 
Schwander, 2012; Rueda, 2006; Palier – Thelen, 2012). This process and effect 
is said to occur throughout different welfare regime, and notably punishes young 
people the hardest (Häusermann – Schwander, 2012, pp. 33-37; Emmenegger et 
al, 2012). In the wake of these developments in employment conditions for 
young people, I turn to the issue of what logics and what specific policy tools 
policymakers have used to manage the youth unemployment problem.  
2.3 Youth unemployment policy options  
In the study of youth unemployment policies in Europe, many efforts have been 
made to divide the different types of active labour market reforms targeting 
youth unemployment in sub-categories, depending on the nature, purpose and 
scope of the programmes. Some use the broader categories such as “employment 
sector” (public or private) or “level of implementation” (national or local) 
(Fougere et al, 2000), but also whether the supply side of labour (the workers) or 
the demand side (employers) is targeted. In this thesis, I focus on youth 
employment programmes at the national level with both demand and supply side 
features and how these are believed to counter youth unemployment among the 
policymakers. In what follows, I give an overview of the possible and plausible 
policy options for these actors.  
2.3.1 Supply side reforms 
Human Capital Investments. A central tool in the pallet of youth unemployment 
policy measures is efforts to increase the young person‟s aptitude and experience 
for employment (Bonoli, 2011, pp. 320-322). These methods are often taken 
together with school-systems and vocational training opportunities already in 
upper secondary school, as „vocational training‟ can have both meanings. In 
many studies, the benefits of a functional vocational training or apprenticeship 
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are taken as a given, with its objective to prepare young people for the labour 
market through higher education and skills acquired thereby, for the work-life 
and the necessary transition from school to work (Biavaschi et al., 2012; 
Soskice, 1994). The remuneration that the young receive through their trainings 
is often lower than what the corresponding salary would be. This is however 
accepted among the different parties, as the apprentices are not yet perceived as 
qualified for ordinary employment. 
 
Employment assistance. This type of reform is a common labour market policy 
tool aimed at enhancing the supply-side of labour, namely the jobseeker and 
their aptitude and possibilities of finding vacancies and fitting themselves to a 
suitable job. Courses and workshops organized by the PES or private job 
distribution agencies might be offered, aimed at helping young people writing 
CV‟s, get practice at interview situations and learn how to promote their 
strengths (Bonoli, 2011, p. 321-323). 
 
Incentive reinforcement. Measures intended to decrease the duration and/or level 
of unemployment benefits, or in other ways making the remuneration for young 
unemployed contingent on active participation or counter-performance (Knotz – 
Lindvall, 2015; Martin, 2000) are called “incentive reinforcements” with a 
common word. By reducing such passive labour market policies, which 
originally are put in place to protect the unemployed against the economic risk 
of having no income, the intended effect is to motivate the unemployed to search 
more actively for jobs rather than remaining dependent on benefits (Ferrera – 
Rhodes, 2000).  
2.3.2 Demand side reforms 
When discussing active labour market policies and reforms, it is usually the 
supply side of labour that is in focus, aimed at enhancing the capacity and 
possibility for the jobseekers to acquire an employment through both 
empowering trainings and preparatory programmes. However, in the labour 
market policies nexus the supply side reforms are interconnected and interplay 
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with the demand side reforms and interventions. Notwithstanding the economic 
cycles that may render the national economic climate favourable or unfavourable 
for hiring new staff (due to the interest rate and the cost of loaning money to 
expand the staff), there are other factors determining the willingness among 
employers to hire a young person (Martin, 2000; Bell – Blanchflower, 2011). On 
such measure is tax breaks or decreases in employer fees for companies aimed at 
lowering the threshold for young people transitioning into work. The drawback 
of this reform is that there is no waterproof way of guaranteeing that the higher 
disposable income for the companies will be used for employing young people.     
      Another way to stimulate job creation through demand side interventions is 
to introduce youth wages, that may fall below the ordinary wages for non-youth 
workers, in order to make it less costly and more attractive for employers to hire 
young people. Some argue that this reform, although favourable for employers 
who otherwise would not afford hiring another worker, similar to subsidized 
employment also creates crowding effects and instead lead to the dismissal of 
non-youth workers with higher salaries (Martin, 2000).  
       A related measure is to loosen employment protection laws, intended to 
prevent dismissals without causes such as „grave misconduct‟ and to allow for 
at-will contracts or other types of contracts than permanent employment. This 
relaxation of employment laws aim at increasing flexibility at the labour market 
and facilitating labour market access and entry for young people (Wolbers, 
2007; Noelke, 2011). The UK is typically given as an example of countries 
where the flexibility and volatility is high on the labour market, which on the 
one hand may lead to high turnover at different workplaces, but also shorter 
unemployment spells since the thresholds to the labour market are lower (Blasco 
et al., 2003; Lewis et al., 1998; Eurofund, 2014).  
 
Direct employment subsidies. These jobs are sponsored by the government and 
are aimed at activating the young jobseekers through real work experience from 
either public or private employers. These reforms are efficient in increasing the 
activation rate among young people, as the government subsidizes the positions 
with the employer and thus does not require other expenses from that party. On 
the other hand, this type of labour market policy may also cause „crowding 
effects‟. This means that the „free labour‟ that the employer receives from the 
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subsidized youth worker may prevent the employer from hiring another 
candidate for the job, due to the relative higher cost of an ordinary employment 
vis-á-vis the subsidized position (Enjolras et al, 2000, pp. 42-65; Trickey – 
Walker, 2000, pp. 194-207). 
2.3.3 Features of youth unemployment policy choices 
I draw on the different youth unemployment policies, demand side and supply 
side oriented, presented above along with the work of Clasen and Clegg (2011) 
and Bonoli (2011), and their contributions to our conceptual understanding of 
different unemployment policy regimes in the activation spectrum. Through 
these, a comparison that focuses on the vital and general aspects of youth 
unemployment policy is possible.  
     Needless to say, these categories function as ideal types in the study of labour 
market reforms and imply broad „umbrella concepts‟, to prevent the following 
cross-country comparison to be stunted by too country-specific features. The 
categories should still cover all the different aspects and varieties of the youth 
unemployment policies that have occurred over the past 25 years, however. I 
draw on the different policy types and features presented in Table 1 when 
tailoring an analytical model for the comparison of Sweden, the UK and France 
in chapters 5 and 6. 
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Table 1. Labour Market Policy tools
Demand side reforms Supply side reforms
Human Capital Investment Tax policy
Vocational training (upper secondary school) Tax breaks employers hiring young workers
Vocational training programmes
Tax reduction on goods and services provided by 
youth employers
Dual apprenticeship system
Placement services (Public or private)       Youth wages
Counselling Wage adjustments for the young
Employment assistance Employment subsidies
Job search programmes Publically funded employment for the young
Incentive Reinforcement Employment protection
Time limits on benefit recipiency Last-in-first-out policy
Benefit reductions      Affirmative action for young jobseekers
Benefit conditionality (sanctions for failing to 
meet the requirements for active job 
searching)
Sources: Clasen - Clegg (2011), Bonoli (2011).  
2.4 My approach and its place in the literature 
The youth policy literature suggests the importance of regime legacy and „path 
dependency‟ on policy design on the one hand and the relatively newer 
convergence literature points to the pressure from globalisation and economic 
forces to streamline policy goals on the other (Lødemel, 2000, p. 305-319). In 
Fenger‟s comparison of welfare regimes, she concludes that there is no evidence 
of a general adaptation of governance models in Europe in the unemployment 
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policy governance field, from her comparison of four European countries (2006, 
pp. 85-87). Conclusive answers, though, as to whether the effects from 
Europeanization and Open Method of Coordination (OMC) processes have 
paved way for a coordinated and converged youth unemployment policy among 
the European Union member states (Drezner, 2001; Bennett, 1991) or that the 
legacies of each country‟s institutional and political legacies indeed prevail and 
keep the systems ever-diverged, have not been provided (Eurofund, 2014; 
Rothstein – Steinmo, 2002; Russell - O‟Connell, 2001). These juxtaposed sets of 
findings leave a gap in the research field, which points me forward. Since some 
years have passed since the 1990s crisis and the Great recession in 2008-2009, 
during which period the three countries in my comparison have experienced 
changes of governments, it is pertinent to pick up the thread where it was left 
and try to shed new light on the path for European welfare states.  
       I choose to look at the motives in statements, debates and argumentations 
coming from members of parliament in Sweden, France and the UK in order to 
understand the motive behind reforms and policy change. The analysis of 
„motives‟ aims at mapping “the conscious considerations that an actor make 
prior to a decision” (Esaiasson et al, 2007, pp. 325, 334-335). Drawing on the 
periods during which the three countries have experienced high levels of youth 
unemployment and perceived it as a problem (Kingdon, 2011), I am able to 
compare the justifications for policies and the cross-temporal as well as cross-
sectional changes. By studying the policy changes both in terms of the financial 
and organizational arrangements of the youth employment programmes and of 
change in ideas and “declared intentions” (Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 62-67) among 
the policymakers, I can capture the nuances of the different rationales over time.  
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3 Theoretical framework 
In this chapter I discuss the theoretical framework that I use to understand youth 
unemployment policy output and change as well as the key national 
policymakers‟ motives for certain policies under different political and 
institutional settings and in different global financial conditions. Since my aim is 
to uncover the divergence or convergence of policy motives, I draw on youth 
transition regime theory to understand the incidence of divergent patterns and of 
policy convergence theory to understand the incidence and different features of 
policy convergence. I formulate hypotheses in connection to the different factors 
that the regime change and youth policy literature propose as drivers behind 
youth unemployment policy in different youth transition regimes, that in the end 
amount to an answer to my research questions:  
 
- To what extent have Sweden, the UK and France’s governments’ formation of 
programmes targeting youth unemployment converged or diverged between 
1990-2014? 
 
The hypotheses are used to guide the search for observable implications of the 
theoretical vantage points in the analysis chapter 5, rather than assumptions that 
are to be accepted or falsified through the process of hypothesis testing. In 
chapter 6, I reiterate to the hypotheses in the comparison of the countries‟ in 
relation to the motive and policy changes they have undergone. 
3.1 Socio-economic transformations in the worlds of 
welfare states 
  14 
In this introductory part of the theoretical chapter, I draw on globalisation theory 
concepts and youth transition and welfare regime change theories in order to 
establish a foundation for my later perspectives on how and why policies in 
general and youth unemployment policy regimes in particular may change over 
time and how actors‟ and their motives and intentions matter in that context.  
3.1.1 Patterns of globalisation, economic downturns and youth 
unemployment 
The point of departure for this thesis is the changing face of the welfare state and 
its responses to the problem of high youth unemployment rates, in the light of 
the socio-economic developments and the new modes of steering that the 
welfare state has undergone over the past few decades. Like in all periods of 
societal changes, ideas and interests arriving both from internal and external 
actors play a determining role and it is in the interaction between the two that 
change takes place (Pierson, 2006; Clasen – Clegg, 2011). The oil crisis in the 
early 1970s confronted advanced capitalist welfare states with severe economic 
volatility, which marked a starting point for endemically high youth 
unemployment rates (Lundin, 2007; Kjeldsen – Bonvin, 2015, pp. 19-21). 
During the 1980s, influential streams of neoliberal ideas and policies were 
characterising not only Liberal welfare states such as the UK, but also countries 
with Universalistic legacies such as Sweden started a shift away from the broad 
macroeconomic goals of full employment and towards balanced budget and low 
inflation (Lindvall, 2010; Brenner, 2004). The European unemployment rates 
fluctuated indeed over the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, but in general stayed higher 
than it was prior to the 1970s crisis (Lindvall, 2010; Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 104-
105). In the wake of global financial recessions and increased volatility, many 
governments were obliged to cut public spending in order to restore the budget 
balance and to avoid sinking deeper into down-turning economic cycle. Others 
took the opportunity to deregulate markets that were formerly nationalized in 
order to increase efficiency, cut public costs and spur economic growth 
(Emmenegger et al, 2012; Lindvall, 2010). The liberal wave that swept through 
the Western world in the late 1970s and early 1980s also touched upon countries 
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with prior long-lasting periods of Social Democratic and strongly corporatist 
governments, such as Sweden and France. This marked a new era in which 
ideological and path-shifting streams from the Right were possible and among 
large parts of the electorate also sought-after. These changes not only caused 
cyclical youth unemployment spikes, but also commanded cuts in high cost 
welfare programmes such as unemployment funds (Aeberhardt et al, 2011), 
labour market programmes and benefit duration periods (Lindvall, 2010, pp. 24-
25). Lødemel argues that despite the party politics in or the regime inheritance of 
a certain country, a large-scale problem such as mass unemployment following 
economic austerity, leads governments to retrench passive measures as a 
response to the economic hardship (2000, pp. 317-318). Thus, we may assume 
that the periods of prolonged financial downturns that Sweden, the UK and 
France experienced in the early 1990s and around 2008-2010 (Pierson, 2001; 
O‟Higgins, 2012; Carcillo et al, 2015) caused either cuts or reallocation of funds 
in welfare programmes at large in order to balance the budget.  
 
Hypothesis 1. At periods of economic downturns, modern welfare states’ 
governments argue for the decrease of funding for passive youth unemployment 
measures (benefit duration and generosity of benefits).  
   
This hypothesis also relates to the issue of the increase of benefit conditionality 
(Scruggs – Allan, 2006), which similarly can be assumed to increase under 
financial austerity and possibly be exacerbated by the political ideology of the 
incumbent government (further discussed in 3.2.2.)  
     The structural unemployment among young people did not recover from the 
decisively large jumps they took across different European welfare regimes in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (Lindvall, 2010; Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 118-120). As 
we can tell from reviewing Figure 1 below, the high youth unemployment levels 
that marked the beginning of the 1990s barely recovered towards the end of the 
same decade (except in France), only to leap up again around the beginning of 
the new millennium and stagnating/started to decrease as late as in 2013. 
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Source: Eurostat, 2015b. 
3.2 Political and institutional determinants of youth 
unemployment policy motives 
The comparative approach of this thesis necessitates a discussion on how to 
think about and treat the three welfare states Sweden, the UK and France as case 
units, based on their legacies from before the period of interest. I discuss these 
topics in earlier sections in this chapter. Of course, the assumption that the three 
countries showed essentially traits different in many aspects of socio-economic 
policy regime in the period when my study departs, early 1990s, are the 
linchpins for the relevance of my research question: whether such different 
countries may nevertheless converge in policy regimes over time?  
3.2.1 Welfare and youth transition regimes 
The regime model, notably developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Korpi 
and Palme (1998), involves the three main welfare regime types in the „world of 
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welfare capitalism‟ and presumes elements of path-dependency, stability and 
observability of institutions and overall an institutional perspective on change. 
Other efforts along the same line hypothesize that government constellation and 
ideology matters little for the generosity of benefits in employment programmes 
(Rueda, 2006). This, too, contributes to the idea that institutional composition 
and legacy matters more than government composition. Other scholars such as 
Walther - Pohl (2005), Gallie - Paugam (2000) and McNeish – Loncle (2003, pp. 
118-119) have developed a model that provides a suitable foundation for regime 
comparison through incorporating the transition patterns from school-to-work 
for young people into the model. It is by and large an elaboration of Esping-
Andersen‟s famous welfare regime model (1990), with the Universalist, the 
Liberal and the “Employment-centred regimes” replacing the Conservative 
regime types, encompassing France and Germany.   
     In the Universalistic regime type, to which Sweden adheres, both the school 
and the training system are broad and inclusive and not specifically tied to 
employers‟ or occupational demands and qualification. This provides a large part 
of freedom and focus on the individual‟s choice and inclination in terms of 
acquiring skills for a future career. The unemployment benefit system is 
comprehensive and inclusive (Walther, 2006; Eurofund, 2014, p. 27). Overall, 
youth policies focused on the provision of educational opportunity are the 
objectives within the Universalistic regime type (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 
118-121). Further, strong employment protection in terms of relatively high 
minimum salaries and last-in-first-out policies signifies the Universalistic youth 
transition regime.  
     The Liberal regime type, to which the United Kingdom belongs, is 
characterised by low thresholds to the labour market but a greater degree of 
expectation on financial independence of the young person from young age. As a 
larger share of the youth population leave school early (Breen, 2005; Lindley, 
1996) and the education system is not specifically geared towards the labour 
market per se, many young do not transition smoothly into employment. The 
unemployment benefit system is less generous and inclusive for the young 
unemployed (Eurofund, 2014, p. 27; Walther, 2006). The objective for the youth 
policies within the Liberal regime type, in general terms, is employability and 
economic independence among the youth (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 118-
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121; Trickey, 2000).  
    The Employment-centred regime type, to which France counts, is signified by 
their selective and standardised educational and training system that to a high 
degree corresponds with the demands from the labour market and employers 
(Eurofund, 2014, p. 27). For France specifically, it is the vocational training in 
upper secondary school that is the linchpin of the transition phase, which is to 
some extent stigmatising for the young and also contributes to a segmentation of 
and higher thresholds to the labour market (Walther, 2006). On the other hand, 
the system can be considered as enabling for young people from socio-
economically disadvantaged families, as the pre-vocational training through the 
secondary education may pave way for a stable employment in a non-academic 
profession. In the Employment-centred regime type, it is the vocational 
qualifications and the allocation of young people to social positions that is the 
focus of the youth policies (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 118-121).   
     Drawing on these regime ideal types and their broader objectives for their 
youth unemployment policy, I formulate the second and third hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2. Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives 
for the youth employment programmes: 
2a: Liberal youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize economic 
independence of the young in the formation of youth unemployment policies 
2b: Universalistic youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize the 
provision of educational opportunity. 
2c: Employment-centred youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize 
vocational qualification in the formation of the youth unemployment policies. 
 
Thus far, we know how to think about and expect behaviour, reforms, 
suggestions of solutions and ideas within the different youth transition regimes. 
In the following, I break down the mechanics of the clockwork that guides youth 
unemployment policy change in different regimes.  
3.2.2 Unemployment benefit systems in different youth transition 
regimes 
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With the changing economic landscape in Europe along with the shifting 
demographic compositions with increased mobility and migration, the national 
labour markets have begun to face new challenges regarding putting young 
people to work and further integrating new citizens (Goodwin – O‟Connor, 
2005). It is the adaptability, commitment and reform capacity of the national 
governments that ultimately determines the smoothness of the acclimatisation to 
new labour market, social and educational contexts, according to some transition 
researchers (Kieselbach, 2003; Cachón Rodríguez, 2003, pp. 67-80). Given the 
emphatic activation trend discussed in the previous chapters, the mixture of 
flexibility and security in the youth unemployment policy, and the overweighing 
emphasis on the one or the other, determines the level of risk transfer from 
society to the individual level (Stauber et al, 2003, pp. 243-257; Elm Larsen, 
2005, pp. 135-140; Barbier, 2005, pp. 113-120; Trickey, 2000). These features 
relate back to the different youth transition regime types and their expected 
responses and strategies to combat youth unemployment in the new contexts of 
delayed adulthood, labour market changes and the risk of social exclusion 
associated to these issues (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 111-121). Thus, I 
formulate the third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3. Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives 
for the formation of benefit systems for the young unemployed.  
3a: Universalistic and Employment-centred (high-committed) countries suggest 
security measures or balanced flexibility and security measures for the young 
unemployed. 
3b: Liberal (low-committed) countries favour flexibility measures at the expense 
of security or balanced flexibility and security measures for the young 
unemployed. 
3.2.3 Party politics and youth unemployment policy change 
There are different theorizing attempts made in order to suggest how change 
takes place, and the main concepts brought forth by the actor-centred historical 
institutionalists Weishaupt (2011), Streeck and Thelen (2005) as well as Hall 
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and Soskice (2001) is reshuffling, realignment
3
 and reassessment
4
. Reshuffling 
means changes in actor constellations, made possible through elections or new 
government formations and alliances post elections. The political incumbents 
and allies‟ positioning on the Left/Right scale may matter for the youth 
unemployment policy formation to the extent that traditional Social Democrat, 
Christian Democrat, Liberal or Conservative values and ideological key points 
are influencing the general direction of the pursued politics (Weishaupt, 2011; 
Korpi – Palme, 2003). In addition to this, the public opinion and expectations on 
the incumbent party or alliance of parties also influences the incumbents‟ 
actions. The propensity for cut spending on youth employment can be expected 
to hinge on the constellations and ideological positioning of the office holders 
(Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 49-51; Amenta, 2003, pp. 104-106). Further, the 
propensity for supporting private or non-public employers, as both a demand 
side incentive to hire is, also, closely connected to party politics (Ibid).  
 
Hypothesis 4. Government placement on the Left/Right political scale matters 
for youth employment spending propensity: 
4a: Left-wing governments increase overall spending on youth unemployment 
policies. 
4b: Right-wing governments decrease overall spending on youth unemployment 
policies. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Government placement on the Left/Right political scale matters 
for subsidization of non-public employers: 
5a. Left-wing governments prefer no subsidization of non-public employers.  
5b: Right-wing governments prefer subsidization of non-public employers.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3
 “How competing interests are mediated, coalitions are formed and pacts are negotiated. Hence it is not only a 
matter of who is “in power” but also what resources these actors have and what allegiances are possible” 
(Weishaupt, 2011, p. 51).  
4
 Focuses on “the underlying ideas and collective puzzling that motivates politics” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 53). 
  21 
If I find support for these hypotheses in the country analyses, it initially implies 
that preferences for certain policies are more contingent on the ideas and 
ideologies of the dominant political party or government coalition than on youth 
transition and welfare regimes‟ specific institutional settings (Kumlin, 2002, pp. 
20-25; Korpi – Palme, 1998; Scruggs – Allan, 2004). However, if I find in the 
comparative discussion that the propensity for spending and/or promotion of 
subsidization of non-public employers correlates between the three countries at 
the last phases in time (where I assume that convergence may have taken place), 
irrespective of incumbent government party, there is support for convergence 
patterns. Conversely, it would imply a weakening of the assumption that youth 
unemployment policies converge overtime if the spending or subsidization 
propensity did not correlate across countries cross-temporally. 
3.3 Idea proliferation and policy convergence theory 
In this section, I present the juxtapose idea to youth transition regime theory 
through the policy convergence theory. The main argument, which I presented in 
the initial discussion about the patterns of globalisation and the externals 
pressures on states to conform policy responses, is that idea proliferation among 
policymakers takes place through ideational or economic driving forces 
(Drezner, 2001). Through channels of experts, inputs from multiple actors 
(IGOs, NGOs, advocacy groups, citizens‟ initiatives etc.) along with the 
inclination to copy „best practices‟, especially in the EU context, different states 
are expected to conform their policies over time (Drezner, 2001; Bennett, 1991). 
Part of the research field concerned with labour market policy shifts zoom in on 
the importance of supra-national influences, both in terms of trade relations and 
global liberalisation trajectories, but also from an institutional point of view. The 
impact of the EU, the establishment and impact of the EES and the practice of 
OMC within the European cooperation is either the central, or in many cases 
studied as an integrated, part of the analysis as the independent variable 
(Emmenegger et al, 2012; Valadas, 2006, pp. 213-218; Serrano Pascual, 2003, 
pp. 86-88). The „Europeanization‟ and coordination of social policies in Europe 
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is regarded as a natural stepping-stone towards a stronger cohesion and more 
efficient financial cooperation. This, in turn, hinges on efficient labour markets 
in the member states that can manage to prepare its young populations for a 
future where flexibility and adaptability is becoming increasingly important 
(Serrano Pascual, 2003, pp. 86-100).   
      Other researchers have taken a purely theoretical perspective on policy 
change as responses to the youth unemployment problem in their studies. Some 
hold change occurring through the mechanisms of „mimetic isomorphism‟ (to 
imitate another organization‟s strategy which is perceived to be the „best 
practice‟) in the OMC framework as a viable change factor (Meijers – Te Riele, 
2004; Lindsay – Mailand, 2004). Others place greater importance in inter-
governmental cooperation and the de facto effects and impacts that organizations 
like the EU, or the OECD, with initiatives like the Luxemburg Summit 1997, 
with the purpose of promoting the integration of young people in the labour 
market, the Maastricht Treaty and the aforementioned EES have had on national 
policy responses (Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 151-155; Lahusen et al, 2013; McNeish 
– Loncle, 2003, p. 105). Primarily due to the fact that youth unemployment was 
first discussed as a European problem and not only a national one, calling for 
some sort of collective understanding and deliberation, and in the wake of the 
1992 crisis, the role of the EU as “idea proliferator” was initiated (Weishaupt, 
2011, pp. 156-157; Rothstein - Steinmo, 2002).  
     Given that the three countries in my comparison all exist and act within the 
same European framework, notwithstanding the fact that Sweden only became a 
member of the EU in 1995, it is safe to assume that 1) the different channels 
through which policy diffusion and convergence may occur is equally accessible 
for all countries and 2) the EES been in effect for long enough period of time to 
have had a chance to influence both the debates and the national policy outputs. 
Thus, regardless of whether the central policymakers in the three countries 
studied verbally express or admit to an intention to streamline national policy 
with the set EU youth agenda, the EU can be assumed to exert convergence 
pressure on the member states concerning the youth unemployment policy.   
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3.4 Different modes of policy convergence 
Scrutinizing convergence or divergence in policy motives of the three countries, 
I draw on Streeck and Thelen (2005) who predict three scenarios regarding 
transformation of welfare states, that are the most likely to occur over time 
looking across nations. These are; continued divergence, uni- or multi-modal 
convergence (convergence over one or a couple of policy areas only) or partial 
convergence where “countries will retain some of their original institutional 
characteristics while adopting a mix of similar instruments in other areas” 
(Weishaupt, 2011, p. 61). The mechanisms through which these scenarios may 
arise and policy regime change may take place are layering (new institutions are 
added to already existing ones), conversion (already existing institutions are 
modified and get a new purpose and function) or exhaustion (an institution is 
redundant and withers away) (Streeck – Thelen, 2005, 19ff).  
     Lødemel discusses whether a convergence across nations and different types 
of workfare, or activation programmes, for general unemployment can be 
ascertained (2000, pp. 303-310). He points out the multi-levelled challenges that 
the concept of convergence and policy diffusion pose, when some fundamental 
trends such as activation and workfare programmes in Western Europe have 
gained ground whereas the configurations and designs of national 
unemployment programmes are still differing and largely following the path and 
legacy of the country regime (Ibid; Seeliger, 1996, p. 289). The notion of 
qualified convergence, then, is when a system was dissimilar from another 
system at a first point in time has assumed the same traits at a later point in time, 
or when both systems (or three considering the case for this thesis) assume a 
new programme or policy regime pattern
5
. As a predecessor for a qualified 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5
 “The operational definition of convergence used in this thesis is: To classify the relative direction of policy 
developments in two countries (e.g. country A and B) we need to have one measurement for each country at one 
point in time (t1) and a second pair of measurements at a later point in time (t2). Becoming more similar 
(convergence) presupposes objective- i.e. measureable – differences in t1. Between t1 and t2 country A, country 
B or both countries must have initiated measures that have reduced the difference measured in T1” (Øverbye, 
1998, p. 150). 
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convergence is the nominal convergence, when a country or other unit of 
comparison accepts a new policy regime or programme when none was before 
(Lødemel, 2000, pp. 305-307). This is an important foundation for my 
comparative approach over time to which I reiterate in the comparative 
discussion regarding the policy trajectories of Sweden, the UK and France in 
chapter 6. 
3.5 The road forward 
In the previous sections I have elaborated on the institutions and actors and the 
different conditions and channels for policy change and the different modes of 
convergence or divergence. This discussion boils down to a theoretical model, or 
an „Analytical grid‟, that comprises and considers the different modes and 
channels for policy change and that serves as a classification scheme for 
policymakers‟ motives and intentions which is the focus point of this thesis. This 
Analytical grid consists of three dimensions through which I look at the policy 
deliberations and the suggested policy changes. These are; the ideational 
dimension, the organisational dimension and the financial dimension 
(Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 60-67). The ideational dimension relates to the subject of 
actor‟s ideas (cognitive and normative) and the goals and intentions behind these 
ideas for the youth unemployment policy. Questions like: What kind of policy 
shall be considered and launched? How comprehensive should the programme 
or reform be, and whom should it target? And, which actors should be involved 
and for what reason? are considered within the confines of this dimension. The 
organisational dimension relates to the governance and the delivery of labour 
market services for the young that is in place in a country context. On what level 
shall a policy implementation take place, and by what type of actor (public or 
non-public, state or non-state)? The financial dimension relates to the locus of 
expenditure that is considered in each country context for the youth employment 
and youth labour market policy strategy at large.   
     These three dimensions form a model for classifying the nature and content 
of the central policy actors‟ motives in the policy formation process and relate 
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back to the five hypotheses. They are meant to facilitate the visualization of the 
classification of different motives and policy configurations that the countries‟ 
governments have intended on the subject of youth unemployment policy over 
time in a clear and intersubjective way. In Table 2 below, the different labour 
market policy areas, and aspects of them that may be discussed in the policy 
deliberations, are presented in the column on the left. Then, following the rows, 
the two or three different policy options possible that the national policymakers 
within the corresponding policy area may propose are presented, without any 
intermutual order.   
  26 
Table 2. Analytical grid 
Labour market policy areas
Incumbent government's intentions for 
public expenditures on youth 
employment
Decrease overall spending for 
youth unemployment
No change in budget from 
prior year
Increase overall spending for 
youth unemployment 
Incumbent government's intended goal 
for youth employment programme
Improve individual's 
employability
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing employability and 
public employment services.
Improve public employment 
service
Main purpose of youth employment 
programme outcome
Economic independence of 
youth 
Educational opportunity for 
the individual's development
Vocational qualification to 
accommodate the industry and the 
indivudual
Conditionality of benefits
Increased benefit conditionality 
or unemployed suggested by 
government
Decreased conditionality of 
benefits for unemployed 
suggested by government Not discussed
Design of youth unemployment policy 
and benefit system Flexibility
Balanced flexibility and 
security Security
Sector specificity of reform Service sector jobs favoured Industry sector jobs favoured
Other or no specific sector 
favoured
Main provider and administrator of 
employment service Public Non-public .
Type of employer targeted Public Both public and private Private
Level of centralization of main 
implementation of reform Central Regional Local
Subsidization
Subsidization of non-public 
employers
Lowered subsidization of non-
public employers
No subsidization of non-public 
employers
Number of actors included in 
unemployment reform Few Several .
Loci of expenditures Passive measures
Both passive and active 
measures Active measures
Response to financial austerity
Governments' intention to 
decrease funding for active 
labour market measures
Governments' intention to 
decrease funding for passive 
labour market measures
No decreased in funding of youth 
unemployment measures intended 
by the government
Ideational dimension
Organisational dimension
Financial dimension
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4 Methodology and data 
In this chapter I account for the case selection logic, the method framework 
consisting of process tracing and motivation analysis as well as how these 
choices affect my rationale for selecting material, validity and generalizability of 
the results. Further, I present an overview of the empirical material and of how 
the operational tools, derived from the theoretical framework are used in the 
following comparative analysis.  
4.1 Case selection 
I intend to observe the motives and preferences of the central policymakers 
involved in the formation of youth employment programmes diachronically and 
synchronically. This is sometimes referred to as a cross-temporal and cross-
sectional study, and aims highlight the temporal development of youth 
unemployment policies to find substantial evidence for divergence or 
convergence patterns (Gerring, 2004; Lahusen et al, 2013). For that purpose I 
apply the „most-different‟ design logic (Anckar, 2008; Lijphart, 1971) to my 
selection of countries. This is sometimes referred to as „maximum variation 
sampling‟, a logic through which the researcher seeks to discern patterns that the 
country cases share, despite their inherit differences in the independent variable 
(Patton, 1990; Gerring, 2004; King – Keohane – Verba, 1994, pp. 137-138). The 
independent variable in this thesis is the institutional and historical 
characteristics in terms of youth unemployment and youth transition policy 
regimes of Sweden, the UK and France, discussed in the previous chapters. 
These countries represent different schools and traditions when it comes to the 
solutions and considerations to youth unemployment issues, considering the 
general policy courses from the 1950s and until the start of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, these are countries that across policy fields, and even across Left- 
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and Right-wing governments, have differed in form and content of the broad 
political courses. 
   The possibilities that „few cases‟, qualitative studies yield, compared to large-
N quantitative studies, are the depth and amplitude of data and information that 
can be obtained about the selected cases (Collier, 2011; Patton, 1990; Ritchie - 
Lewis, 2003, pp. 5-15). However, these qualities hinge on the selection rationale 
for the case studies, which have consequences for the generalizability of the 
conclusions emanating from the comparative analysis (Seawright – Gerring, 
2008). Thus, the conclusions I draw from the analysis of the empirical evidence 
are tuned to fit the scope and possibilities that the small-n research design is 
limited to. 
4.2 Selection of national youth employment reforms 
For the sake of conciseness and due to time constraints, I choose to focus on the 
parliamentary debates surrounding four major youth employment reforms in 
each of the countries that occurred between 1990 and 2014. This time period is 
comparable across countries given the similar influences from the external 
factors: the financial crises and the increased EU engagement in the youth 
unemployment policy field, which have affected them. These reforms and a brief 
description of them are presented in section 4.2.2.   
     Since my objective is to understand and interpret the motives and intentions 
of the parliamentarians involved with the considered and/or implemented 
reforms, I primarily study sources such as transcripts, oral and written questions 
and answers to concerned ministers regarding the youth reform in question, as 
well as minutes from deliberations, debates and speeches on the issue. Secondly, 
I use material such as assessments and motions from concerned committees (e.g. 
Employment, Social affairs, Education Committees), as objects of analysis as 
well as for providing background to the scope and content of the reform. The 
lion share of the material I use for the analysis is acquired through the digitalized 
archives provided by each country‟s parliament. For the earliest reforms in the 
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UK and France, some of the parliamentary records have been retrieved through 
archive studies at the parliamentary archives in London and Paris.  
4.2.1 Selection criteria for national reforms 
In the realm of youth employment reforms, there are many variations with 
respect to scope, target populations, involved actors and sectors instrumental in 
the implementation process or types of jobs sought to stimulate and allocate. In 
the ideal methodological design, the forms chosen within a country and for the 
purpose of cross-country comparison are as similar in scope, target, sector- and 
actor specificities but leave enough room for variation in policy design. In order 
to approach these ideal criteria, I study reforms that are comprehensive in scope, 
namely aiming to target young unemployed people at large or young people with 
a disadvantage on the labour market (e.g. NEETs). The reforms are still similar, 
however, in the way in which they seek to stimulate or create jobs, be it with 
supply or demand side policy tools. Further, I target the reforms that were more 
or less close in time, to account for external financial or institutional influences, 
such as EU initiatives or fluctuations in the international economy. Finally, I 
draw on the reforms that other researchers have favoured for cross-country 
comparative purposes, on similar premises as my own and that are established in 
the literature as central and significant measures within the three countries. In 
the following, I present the four reforms chosen for Sweden, UK and France and 
the material relating to these reforms that serves as the foundation for studying 
the policy formation process. 
4.2.2 Brief introduction to the national youth employment reforms 
Sweden 
1991-1992: Labour market political measures for youth under age 25 (Om 
arbetsmarknadspolitiska åtgärder för unga under 25 år) (Prop. 1991/92:124). 
Presented by the Conservative government (Prime minister Mr. Bildt). This 
reform sought to provide young people without a two-years minimum upper 
secondary education with job training, to close the gap to labour market entry.  
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     1998: Development Guarantee Programme (Utvecklingsgarantin), introduced 
through the Municipalities’ Act for Young People Between 20 and 24 Years Old. 
Presented by the Social Democratic government (Prime minister Mr. Persson). 
This reform sought to expand and improve the possibilities for young people to 
acquire employment and/or the option to continue post-secondary education by 
the allocation of funds to the municipalities and local PES offices.  
     2007: Job and Development Guarantee/Restart jobs (Jobbgarantin för 
ungdomar/Nystartsjobb). Presented by the Centre-Right Coalition government 
(Prime minister Mr. Reinfeldt). This reform sought to motivate young 
unemployed people to become more active in their job search activities, through 
increasing benefit conditionality, but also through improving job search 
assistance at the PES. The Restart jobs clause of the new act offered tax breaks 
for employers who employed young people and also decreased employment fees 
for the same purpose.  
     2011: More Jobs and More Roads to Employment for Young (Fler jobb och 
fler vägar till jobb för unga). Presented by the Centre-Right Coalition 
government (Prime minister Mr. Reinfeldt). This act decreased the VAT (value 
added tax) for restaurant businesses, with the purpose of making it more 
affordable for such employers to hire young people. The same act also sought to 
increase the number of slots at post-secondary school education programmes.  
 
United Kingdom 
1996: Job seekers’ allowance Act. Presented by the Conservative Government 
(Prime minister Mr. Major). The purpose with this act was to motivate a more 
active job search amongst the young unemployed and to step away from less 
conditional unemployment benefit disbursements (Jobseekers act 1995).  
     1998: New Deal for Young People. Presented by the Centre-Left government 
(Prime minister Mr. Blair). This reform was designated to be a three-phase 
programme with job search assistance and individual action plans facilitated by 
the PES offices as a first step, and a training or internship programme for the 
ensuing period if the young person has not found employment in the first phase.  
     2009: The Young Person’s Guarantee. Presented by the Centre-Left 
government (Prime minister Mr. Brown). This reform guaranteed the young 
unemployed individual an employment, a state-subsidized employment or a 
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training position after twelve months of unemployment. The key employment 
sectors were retail, tourism and hospitality and the funding was drawn from the 
Future Jobs Fund. 
     2011: Work Programme. Presented by the Conservative-Liberal coalition 
government (Prime minister Mr. Cameron). This programme sought to engage 
employers in job creation for young people (as well as adults) who were less 
likely to find employment. This plan was funded by the government through 
bonuses for the employers and sought to help participants to come off benefits 
(DWP, 2012).  
 
France 
1992: Preparation active á la qualification á l’emploi (PAQUE) (Active 
preparation for the qualification to employment). Presented by the Left coalition 
government (Prime ministers Mme. Cresson and M. Bérégovoy). This 
programme sought to aid young people without upper secondary school 
diplomas to achieve such, or to prepare them for ordinary work through 
subsidized employments. 
     1996: Nouveaux Services – Emploi Jeunes (NSEJ) (New services for young 
unemployed). Presented by the Conservative government (Prime minister M. 
Juppé). This programme sought to stimulate employment in “new service jobs” 
through government subsidies to employers who chose to engage young people.  
     2009: Haute Commissaire á la Jeunesse/Plan d’Urgence (High commissary 
for youth/Emergency plan). Presented by the Conservative government (Prime 
minister M. Fillon). This reform sought to cut taxes for enterprises and 
employers who chose to engage young people in employment or training 
positions.  
     2014: Garantie Jeunes (Youth Guarantee). Presented by the Socialist 
government (Prime minister M. Valls). This reform established a network 
between employers and the French government that sought to offer a co-
subsidized employment to young unemployed individuals. It specifically 
targeted young people without adequate secondary education and work 
experience. 
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4.3 Process tracing 
Since the purpose of this study is to examine the trajectories of the different 
countries‟ youth unemployment policies, I delve deeper into the processes of 
forming these policies, in which the intrapersonal mechanism of the political 
deliberations can be compared to those of the other countries. This method is 
named process tracing. In this „within-case analysis‟, that the study of the 
national reforms comprises (George – Bennett, 2005; Bennett – Elman, 2006), I 
seek to understand the effects of the political legacies of the different youth 
transitioning regimes on the policy deliberations. Additionally, I take into 
account the common European and intergovernmental context and the effects 
this may have had on the dependent variable: the youth employment 
programmes and the politicians‟ motivations behind which. Subsequently, I 
move to compare these within-case studies to be able to discern and highlight 
similarities and differences. This way of doing process tracing is what Collier 
describes as the “systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and 
analysed in the light of the research question” (2011, p. 823) with the purpose of 
richly describing a process. My scope is limited to locating the evidence of a 
causal mechanism at work in either the youth transition regime or the policy 
convergence theory, since it is beyond the range of this thesis to determine 
precisely why certain policy areas converge over time, if they do (Mahoney – 
Rueschmeyer, 2003, pp. 8-16).  
Even if my methodology focuses on actors and their speech acts, the 
relevance of institutions is undisputable. I use the definition of institutions as 
“designed and codified rules conceived of by policymakers but upheld by 
informal institutions such as culture and political legacies formed throughout 
history” (Weishaupt, 2011, pp. 37-38). This analytical use of the concept allows 
me to both study institutions as formalized structures in the youth unemployment 
policy domain, such as for instance or counselling at the PES for the young or 
benefit conditionality elaborated on in 3.3. Or, as public policies designed to 
obtain a certain societal or financial goal, such as more specific skills and 
adaptability for the young in the modern labour market through specific training 
programmes.  
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4.4 Actor-centred historical institutionalism 
As institutions are constantly contested and revised according to the historical 
institutionalist perspective, it is natural that they are under change but that 
change occurs in a “veil of continuity” (Weishaupt, 2011, p. 42). Within this 
veil, actors and their ideas are considered as „reflexive agents‟ that take the 
political legacy and trajectories and the compound underpinnings of current 
institutions in considerations when they opt for different policy options. The 
actors‟ motivations may be based on interest, power hunger or sheer ideology, 
but the room for action is contingent on institutions that to a high degree are 
continuous but where change takes place under different processes or 
combinations of processes (Rothstein - Steinmo, 2002, pp. 92-125). Since my 
aim is to explore the trajectories of the three countries it is equally meaningful to 
consider actors‟ part in policy change, within the framework of institutions as a 
relatively „sticky‟ element, and thus try to straddle a positivist (institutionalist) 
and an interpretivist perspective (Culpepper, 2002). If policymakers live and act 
in a context where input may arrive both from political allies as well as 
opponents, from civil society and social partners, from foreign governments and 
the EU or the OECD, then their agency is necessary to consider, notwithstanding 
the assumed stability of institutions. Thus, the actor-centred historical 
institutionalist (ACHI) perspective caters to the purpose of this project and to the 
research question and may be a useful framework through which I am enabled to 
examine policy change over time.  
      Thus, the process tracing and ACHI perspective in this thesis corner the 
actors‟ doings during the formative moments; the responses that the three 
countries governments and parliaments have put out in relation to four major 
reforms that each of the countries‟ have launched, in response to mass youth 
unemployment (Collier – Collier, 1991, pp. 27-33; Esaiasson et al, 2007, pp. 
144-46; Fenger, 2006, p. 75). However, the methodological tools necessary to 
systematically interpret, understand and be able to compare these results under 
the process-tracing arch need further refinement, and I turn to the instruments 
that motivation analysis provides to sharpen my analytical edge further.  
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4.4.1 Motivation analysis 
In order to draw any conclusions with regards to the convergence or divergence 
patterns across the three country regimes it is necessary to obtain a full and clear 
understanding of the central actors and the choices they have faced at certain 
points in time with regards to youth unemployment policy. And, how they have 
reasoned prior to and during the launch of a major youth employment reform. 
The motivation analysis, also known as intention analysis, seeks to facilitate the 
recognition and categorization of key actors‟ motives for the researcher, and to 
enable an intelligible weighing and valuing of the motives (Esaiasson et al, 
2007, pp. 328ff). Therefore, the issues I consider in the valuing of the 
motivations and intentions behind the four major reforms in Sweden, the UK and 
France are: What are the key actors involved? What are the reasonable policy 
options available to the policymakers? What possible motives may they have, 
prior to a decision? What values or strategies are emphasized and not in the 
statements or expressed intentions for the programme? Are there any conflicts of 
interest within or between parties, and which argument ended up winning over 
another, in the final output of the policy? (Esaiasson et al, 2007, pp. 330-335). 
The second question is answered in Figure 1, laying out the relevant policy 
options for the policymakers. The key actors referred to in the first questions is 
the politicians operating within the current parliaments, primarily the ones 
involved in youth unemployment issues or employment issues at large. I detect 
the influence of these through the mentioning of such influence points in the 
parliamentary transcripts or policy documents. In the examination of the actors‟ 
motives, I draw on the five hypotheses
6
 in order to narrow the search for relevant 
information in relation to the research question.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
6
 Hypothesis 1. At periods of economic downturns, modern welfare states’ governments argue for the decrease of 
funding for passive youth unemployment measures (benefit duration and generosity of benefits). Hypothesis 2. 
Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives for the youth employment programmes. 
Hypothesis 3. Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives for the formation of benefit 
systems for the young unemployed. Hypothesis 4. Government placement on the Left/Right political scale matters 
for youth employment spending propensity. Hypothesis 5. Government placement on the Left/Right political 
scale matters for subsidization of non-public employers.  
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4.4.2 Operationalization: the observable implications of convergence 
or divergence patterns on policy formation  
My motivation analysis rationale comprises three criteria for the data studied to 
ascertain the properly value the motive indicators; the social desirability criteria 
(that the statements made by the key actor is not affected by the willingness to 
portray another image in relation to the motives than the „true‟ one); the 
dependency criteria (that selected material and basis for a motive analysis is first 
hand and not anyone else‟s representation); and the contemporaneity criteria 
(that the statements studied are made in contemporaneity with the policy in 
question) (Esaiasson et al, 2007, pp. 337-340).  
     Further, the weighing process of the detected motives accounts for; the 
frequency of a motive expressed in the empirical material; the placement of a 
motive in the textual representation of a speech or in a policy document, which 
might indicate importance; the stability of a motive, meaning the occurrence of 
the same motive and rationale in different parts or stages of the policy process, 
and in conclusion the motive‟s accordance with other motives made by a certain 
actor or groups of actors used in other debates (Esaiasson et al, 2007, pp. 337-
340). When I analyse the motives of parliamentarians, I search for these 
characteristics in the speeches and other outlets of their rationales and 
preferences and code them in accordance with the Analytical grid presented in 
Table 2 in section 3.4.  
4.5 Validity, reliability and limitations 
A benefit employing a qualitative method in a comparative analysis is the 
adaptability of theoretical categories as well as the openness for what the 
empirical observations and the material at large can bring to the analysis, even 
though the trade off is the limited possibilities for exact replication of the study 
and thus to some extent validity (Ritchie - Lewis, 2003, pp. 12-17). However, 
given clarity of the operational concepts and categories as well as the 
transparency of the procedures of choosing material and categorizing the 
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statements, arguments and motives that the empirical material provides, high 
validity may be obtained in this qualitative research effort. Further, by selecting 
country cases and major reforms based on the explanatory, independent, variable 
which is transition regimes and political legacy of Sweden, the UK and France, 
selection bias is avoided since the dependent variable, the features and 
components of the youth unemployment policies expressed through the reforms 
studied is not taken into account in the selection process (King et al, 1994, pp. 
137-140).  
     A limitation to this thesis project is the lack of possibility to give a fully 
representative and detailed image of the youth unemployment policies and a 
comparison between them, since I have limited the studied reforms to four for 
each country. If I could have included and coded all measures and steps along 
the way since 1990 and until present day, I may have had omitted the risk of 
being mislead by the material and consequently drawing flawed conclusions. 
Thus, the conclusions I draw in the context of the methodology in place must 
account for these limitations and reflect the possible inaccuracies that the 
comparison may yield. Another possible limitation is the lack of 
contemporaneity of most of the reforms, which has lead me to focus on a textual 
analysis rather than interviews with concerned politicians involved in the policy 
process. The obvious drawback of that is the risk of misinterpretation of a 
statement and the lack of possibility to backtrack with the concerned 
policymakers, other than through other written sources. 
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5 Analysis of youth unemployment 
policy change over time in the three 
countries  
In this chapter I present the results from the analysis of the three countries in my 
study. Each country section begins with a brief display of the lay of the land for 
young people and the labour market around the start of the studied period. By 
discussing each of the reforms separately from the context of, but not limited to, 
the Analytical grid (Table 2), I create a basis for understanding the within-
country change between 1990-2014. To conclude each country section, I 
consolidate the findings from each dimension and present these in the Analytical 
grid, denoting the change or stability of the ideational, organizational and 
financial dimensions‟ indicators of the country‟s youth unemployment policies. 
5.1 Sweden 
5.1.1 A brief background on the youth labour market situation in 
Sweden in the 1990s   
One of the defining traits of the Swedish labour market policy and system for 
young people is the high level of employment and wage protection, policies in 
effect since long before the 1990s. Some employment scholars think of these as 
hurdles both “keeping and entering” a job due to the “last in first out” policy 
(Bygren et al, 2005, pp. 135-158). Thus, in earlier periods when youth 
employment was high in Sweden (see Figure 1) and job opportunities plenty for 
young, unqualified job seekers, the nature of the youth unemployment problem 
and its severity was different and not as pressing as the ensuing era of 
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deindustrialization and the economic crisis around 1992 (Bygren et al, 2005, pp. 
135-158; Lindvall, 2010). It is in the wake of these circumstances, coupled with 
the new demands for technological and engineering skills to accommodate the 
increasingly important technology sector for the Swedish trade and overarching 
economic sustenance, that the Swedish government acknowledged the need for 
new and more comprehensive labour market programmes for the young (Kildal, 
2001). 
5.1.2 Labour market political measures for youth under age 25 
(AMPU) 
Ideational dimension 
Launched in the summer of 1992, the AMPU was by all intents of purposes 
proposed by the Conservative coalition government as a temporary measure that 
would accommodate the most vulnerable young with internships and in-job 
trainings with public and private employers until the “bad economic times” had 
turned (Protokoll 1991/92:124). Whereas large parts of the Left leadership in 
youth issues expressed a multifaceted concern with the programme on a labour 
rights basis (although giving positive testimonies to the attempts by the 
government to do something about aggravating youth situation following the 
crisis), the programme formation remained relatively intact after its preparation 
in the Conservative dominated Employment Committee (Protokoll 
1991/92:124). The Left opposition feared most of all that this “new type of 
worker”, the intern, would violate the employment laws granting any hired 
worker the right to a regulated salary. A recommendation from the government 
was to pay lower allowance to those young succumbing to the internships 
programme, as to not “create disincentives to take up educational opportunity or 
real employment” (Protokoll 1991/92:69). The bearing argument from the 
Conservative incumbents, which was partly accepted by the opposition, was the 
need to activate the young that otherwise would “hang in the streets” and cash in 
benefits idly (Protokoll 1991/92:69; 1991/92:67).  
 
Organizational dimension 
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The novelty of the politicians‟ way of shaping policy for the youth 
unemployment problem in this measure seems to have been the effort to 
incorporate the private sector as a possible intern employer and also involve 
other stakeholders (Protokoll 1991/92:111). The view that „not only the public 
actors‟ should get access to the young in terms of (cheap) labour was prevalent 
among the Conservatives. The private employers should be solicited to pay for a 
small share of the intern‟s allowance, both political sides agreed, and only the 
Left party proposed a remuneration equal to that of an ordinary worker 
(Protokoll 1991/92:111).  
 
Financial dimension 
The financial crisis that hit Sweden during 1991-1992 is doubtlessly present in 
the way that both political blocks carry their arguments and considerations for 
the policy formation of the new programme (Protokoll 1991/92:67; 1991/92:69). 
However, it is clear from the lengthy parliamentary debates on the matter that 
the Left proposed higher government spending to counter the high 
unemployment levels, whereas the Right argued for more moderate spending 
and „any type of activation‟ for the young. Thus, such activation that leads to 
youth unemployment does not decrease in the long-term (Protokoll 
1991/92:111).  
5.1.3 Development Guarantee for Youth (UG) 
Ideational dimension 
The UG was launched in 1998 and was intended by the Social Democratic 
government to accommodate the young unemployed with an employment, 
training or internship position or an education enrolment after 100 days of 
unemployment (IFAU, 2002). Since the youth unemployment had gone down 
with the recent upturning economic cycle, the Social Democratic leadership in 
youth employment matters intended the UG to be a continuation of that trend 
(Protokoll 1997/98:30). They aimed to activate more young persons through 
subsidized employment in the public sector in order to get the employment rates 
up and to keep the young unemployed acquiring skills that might improve future 
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employment chances (Protokoll 1997/98:30; 1997/98:49). The Left party was 
opposed to this idea and criticized that the measure would be a substitute for 
“creation of real jobs” through increased public sector spending and 
unsubsidized, mandatory training offered by the private sector (Protokoll 
1997/98:49). They also criticized the low remuneration for the subsidized 
employments (Motion 1998/99:A273). The Right-wing opposition of all stripes, 
however, expressed a worry about the “business-unfriendly” nature of the UG 
and the related tax policy that, according to the Right, made it “too expensive” 
for the private sector to hire young and promoted decreased employment tax 
(Protokoll 1997/98:30; Protokoll 1997/98:102). Arguments were made by the 
Right that the young first and foremost needed better education and should be 
encouraged to seek employment opportunities in the private sector, which the 
Social Democratic government was not willing to incorporate in the programme 
(Protokoll 1997/98:49).  
 
Organizational dimension 
The UG was designed and designated by the Social Democratic government to 
target public employers through subsidized jobs. There were no large-scale 
reforms of the PES or other employment services intended through the UG, but a 
part of the aim of the larger budget was to give job centres more means to give 
the young a more individually fitted service (Protokoll 1997/98:30).  
 
Financial dimension 
The Social Democratic government meant to activate the young unemployed 
through the increased support for employment subsidies and public job 
opportunities. Many Conservative policymakers criticized the magnitude of the 
youth employment budget and especially its focus on the public sector, which 
they believed to collaterally lead to lower tax base and lower growth (Protokoll 
1997/98:49; 1997/98:121).  
5.1.4 Job and Development Guarantee (JDG) 
Ideational dimension 
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The JDG was introduced in 2007 by the newly elected Conservative coalition 
government as the hitherto largest youth employment programme, which not 
only claimed about half of the PES‟s resources but also entailed large activation 
ambitions for the jobless youth (RiR 2009:22; Prop. 2006/07:118). It sought to 
deliver a job, training or education offer to the young after three months of 
unemployment and a guaranteed training after six. In the presentation of the 
JDG, the Conservative Minister of Labour claimed that it would pave way for 
more activated young through the means of increased flexibility of the benefit 
system, incentives for the private sector to hire young and more job search 
services offered by the PES (Protokoll 2006/07:19). Accusing the former Social 
Democratic government for having caused the hike in youth unemployment with 
the “inefficient youth internships” and subsidized employments, the 
Conservative coalition government drew on the Danish „new deal‟ as a „best 
practice‟ in order to motivate the measure (Protokoll 2006/07:19; 2006/07:91). 
The Left-wing opposition together with the Green party strongly opposed this 
step, arguing that the intended “flexicurity” of the Danish system, praised by the 
Ministers of Labour and Finance, meant merely stricter conditionality and lower 
benefits (Protokoll 2006/07:95).  
 
Organizational dimension 
One of the main pillars of the Conservative coalition government‟s programme 
was the decrease of employment tax for companies hiring young people between 
20-24 years of age, which many Right-wing politicians argued would lead to 
strong incentives for businesses of all sizes to hire young (Protokoll 2006/07:19; 
2006/07:95). Therefore, the bearing argument from the Right wing was that 
cheaper hiring for the private sector along with more coaching, job search 
support and individually designed plans to transition the young into labour 
would interplay and generate higher employment rates and more jobs (Ibid).  
 
Financial dimension 
Since the Swedish national economy experienced a rise in 2006/2007, either the 
Conservative coalition government or the Left/Green opposition saw any reason 
why the expenditures on youth employment would not increase (Protokoll 
2006/07:19; 2006/07:91; 2006/07:95). However, the government‟s retrenchment 
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of the unemployment benefit duration and rate for young people was widely 
opposed by the opposition, notwithstanding the fact that the expenditures on 
active measures rose with the spring budget for 2007 (Protokoll 2006/07:91; 
2006/07:95). 
5.1.5 More Jobs and More Roads to Employment for Young (FJFV) 
Ideational dimension 
Four years after the launch of the JDG, the Conservative coalition government 
introduced a similar measure to stave off the increasingly high youth 
unemployment. The main elements of the FJFV were lowered VAT for 
restaurants and bars as well as some groundwork for a new apprenticeship 
system (Regeringskansliet, 2011). The belief in increased tax alleviations for the 
employers that typically employ young people, service sectors such as restaurant 
operations, was strong among the governmental parties (Protokoll 2011/12:35). 
Furthermore, many Conservatives and Liberals meant that targeting service 
sector employers was a two-folded benefit since it also would favour the least 
qualified young; those with inadequate education records or little other 
experience (Ibid). These arguments were criticized from the Left/Green 
opposition, of whom many argued that those measures were already tried and 
proven inefficient given the meagre results from the JDG (Protokoll 2011/12:35; 
2011/12:90).  
    In a similar way in which the Danish system was held as an example of „best 
practice‟ in the formation of the JDG, the German dual apprenticeship systems 
and vocational education in upper secondary school were this time promoted by 
the Right wing (Protokoll 2011/12:90). Notwithstanding the opposing arguments 
from different parts of the Left/Green parties towards the German system, the 
Right wing contended that a stronger link to the labour market and incentive to 
finish upper secondary school for the non-university bound would push back the 
youth unemployment rates (Protokoll 2011/12:90; 2011/12:107).  
 
Organizational dimension 
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The ideological conflict between Left and Right over the government‟s targeted 
tax alleviation for the private sector, at the expense of public sector and „welfare 
jobs‟ in education and health care according to the Left-wing opposition, 
persisted in the FJFV deliberations (Protokoll 2011/12:35; 2011/12:90). Aside 
from that aspect of the new youth employment programme, not many other 
features were altered or up for discussion to be altered with the FJFV. 
 
Financial dimension 
Given the external pressure on the Swedish economy caused by the Great 
recession, the Conservative government held back the passive measure spending, 
just along the road staked out with the JDG, but also decreased the expenditures 
for education (Protokoll 2011/12:51). This position was highly unpopular among 
the opposition, who emphasized the importance of higher education possibilities 
as a safer route to secure employment for the young generation (Ibid).  
5.2 Discussion and classification of the Swedish 
youth unemployment policy motives 
In what follows, I discuss the findings of the analysis of the development of the 
Swedish youth unemployment policy, drawing on the Analytical grid and the 
three dimensions; ideational, organizational and financial presented in Table 2. 
The findings presented under section 5.1 and their classification and coding is 
displayed in Table 3. In the columns, the different youth programmes are 
presented in chronological order along with the outcome of the governments‟ 
motives in each policy area. I focus mainly on the indicators where there has 
been the most change over time and/or contingent on incumbent government.  
     Starting with the ideational dimension, the promotion of more spending on 
youth employment measures has been increasing rather uniformly and cutting 
across party lines, although the expenditure posts are more ideologically biased. 
For instance, the Right-wing governments have consistently promoted tax 
alleviations for private sector employers as an active labour market policy 
measure, whereas the Left-wing government in 1997/98 targeted subsidized 
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employment in the public sector and kept insisting for these measures in the later 
debates too. As such, there is no support for the assumption that partisanship or 
ideology would influence de facto propensity to spend, but there is for what 
types of labour market policies to spend on. This trend is, conversely, found in 
the design of benefit system, where the Left-wing government did not introduce, 
flexibility measures whereas the Right-wing governments sought policies that 
would enforce flexibility but with more or less compensatory security measures.  
    Two ideational indicators that seem to shift overtime, regardless of incumbent 
government‟s political belonging, are both the goals and the main purpose of the 
youth employment programme. During the 1990s, the goals for the reforms were 
to improve the individual‟s employability, first and foremost, which later was 
accompanied by the other goal to also improve the PES. Similarly, reviewing the 
main purpose for the reforms, the aim changed from focusing on the educational 
opportunity of the individual only, in the 1990s, to the two-fold ambition to also 
emphasise vocational qualification: both for the sake of the individual and for 
the demands of the industry. Thus, the finding supports the assumption that there 
has been a shift towards a layering of policies, on the domain of the main 
purpose of youth programme in Sweden (Streeck – Thelen, 2005).   
     Reviewing the organizational dimension, the developments that stand out the 
most are the partisan nature of the subsidization and targeted employer 
indicators. Whereas the Right-wing governments in their three launched reforms 
were favouring and promoting the subsidization of non-public employers, 
through decreases in employment tax for hiring young people, the Left-wing 
government were not pursuing these policies in 1997/98 when they were in 
power.  
     This result may seem unambiguous, but the matter of fact is that most 
members of the Social Democratic and even the Left party leadership in youth 
employment issues expressed a willingness to subsidize private employers too 
for taking on young workers in the 2007/8 and 2011/12 debates when they 
presented their „shadow budgets‟ for youth labour market policies. Although, the 
magnitude of expenditures were always smaller than the Right-wing‟s and 
equally, if not more, targeting the public employers through subsidized 
employments in the public sector.   
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Table 3. Analytical grid for 
Sweden AMPU UG JDG FJFV
Labour market policy areas
Incumbent government's 
intentions for public 
expenditures on youth 
employment
Decrease overall 
spending on youth 
employment
Increase overall 
spending on youth 
employment
Increase overall spending 
on youth employment
No change in budget 
from prior year
Incumbent government's 
intended goal for youth 
employment programme
Improve individual's 
employability
Improve individual's 
employability
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing employability 
and improving public 
employment services.
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing 
employability and 
improving public 
employment services.
Main purpose of youth 
employment programme 
outcome
Educational 
opportunity for the 
individual's 
development
Educational 
opportunity for the 
individual's 
development
Educational opportunity 
for the individual's 
development / Vocational 
qualification to 
accommodate the 
industry and the 
individual
Educational opportunity 
for the individual's 
development / 
Vocational qualification 
to accommodate the 
industry and the 
individual
Conditionality of benefits
Increased benefit 
conditionality for 
unemployed suggested 
by government
Not discussed, 
unaltered.
Increased benefit 
conditionality for 
unemployed suggested by 
government
Not discussed, 
unaltered.
Design of youth unemployment 
benefit system
Balancing flexibility 
and security Security Flexibility
Balancing flexibility 
and security
Sector specificity of reform
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Service sector jobs 
favoured
Service sector jobs 
favoured
Main provider and 
administrator of employment 
service Public Public Public Public
Type of employer targeted Public and private Public Private Private
Level of centralization of main 
implementation of 
unemployment reform Regional Local Local Local
Subsidization
Subsidization of non-
public employers
No subsidization of 
non-public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Number of actors included in 
the implementation of 
unemployment reform Several Several Several Several
Loci of expenditures Active measures Active measures Active measures Active measures
Response to financial hardship
Government's 
intention to decrease 
funding for active and 
passive measures Not applicable Not applicable 
Government's intention 
to decrease funding for 
passive measures and 
increase funding for 
active measures
Organizational dimension
Financial dimension
Ideational dimension
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5.3 United Kingdom 
5.3.1 A brief background on the youth labour market situation in the 
United Kingdom in the 1990s   
Following the Thatcher era during the 1970s and 1980s, the English labour 
market and social security policies began its active and retrenchment path in 
1988, when youth aged 16-17 were disbarred from income support (Jones – 
Novak, 2012, pp. 65-68). The first comprehensive effort on the part of the 
English government to launch a labour market measure to spur employment for 
the young in the wake of the crisis in the early 1990s was the Jobseeker‟s 
allowance act in 1995. It further lowered the benefit rates for people under 25 
years (Jones – Novak, 2012, pp. 65-68). Contrary to the other countries of study, 
evidence from the early activation era does not suggest a special targeting or 
affirmative action of the youth and their vulnerability on the labour market in the 
UK (Van Reenen, 2000). The relatively low unemployment rates in the UK (see 
Figure 1) motivated a different trajectory for the Conservative government until 
1997, that primarily focused on reforming the benefit system and that let the job 
creation be a matter for the market (Knotz – Lindvall, 2015; Rueda, 2007). Other 
authors have emphasized the importance of globalisation and the higher demand 
for skills for the increased youth unemployment rates in the early 1990s and the 
flexibility-oriented responses that followed suit from both Conservative and 
Labour governments (Fransesconi – Golsch, 2006, pp. 255-260; Lindsay – 
Mailand, 2004). Regardless of the incumbent government party the aftermath of 
ERM crisis in 1992 and the Great recession in 2008-2009 were external shocks 
that immediately affected youth employment rates negatively and motivated 
active responses from the government.  
5.3.2 Jobseekers‟ Allowance Act (JSA) 
Ideational dimension 
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The JSA, enacted in June 1995, was an ample act that sought to “promote the 
employment of the unemployed and the assistance of persons without a settled 
way of life” (Jobseekers Act 1995). It targeted both adults and young people 
under 25 years old
7
. In all essential, it was not a measure that particularly 
emphasized learning or skill-development from the Conservative initiative-
takers side, but rather a strategy through which all young people would need to 
„earn‟ their benefits through work or other activations (HL Deb 1995a, HL Deb 
1995b). Idleness and benefit-taking were tendencies among the young believed 
to be curable with both a stick (benefit conditionality) and carrots (continued 
training programmes, however not guaranteed) by the Conservative government 
(HC Deb 1995a). The government promoted a benefit-level that corresponded to 
contribution, something that many Labour politicians opposed on a youth 
discrimination basis (HC Deb 1995a; Early Day motion 84); however not as an 
idea promoting a „from welfare to work‟ movement. Another major fault-line 
between the two parties was drawn over the issue of minimum wages, for young 
and adult workers, which the Conservative Secretary of Employment along with 
other prominent party members regard as a suicide for the economy and the 
hiring-climate for the private sector (HC Deb 1995c; 1995b). 
 
Organizational dimension 
The dominant standpoint among the Conservative politicians was that it was not 
within the scope of the government to create jobs: that was a matter for the 
private sector (HC Deb 1995a). The government‟s responsibility though, was to 
stimulate the economy, keep the labour market unregulated and to not introduce 
minimum wage measures (HC Deb 1995d); something that Labour 
representatives found irresponsible and a sign of indifference for the young 
generation (HC Deb 1995b).  
 
Financial dimension 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
7
 Examining the aspects of the Act that concerned young persons in particular, this discussion sheds light on the 
aims and intentions of concerned policymakers for the young unemployed and their ideas and motives to remedy 
youth unemployment by the means of the JSA.  
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The bearing argument in the Conservatives‟ programme proposal for the JSA 
was that „work should pay‟, meaning decreased benefits rates for young 
jobseekers‟ in general and for the „idle‟ in particular, should they fail to actively 
seek for jobs, as an incentive measure (HC Deb 1995a; Employment Committee, 
1994). This viewpoint per se was not criticized by the Labour opposition, but 
rather the combination of „increased conditionality‟ and „not sufficient‟ funding 
and ambitions for training, apprenticeships or subsidised jobs for the young 
(Employment Committee, 1995). 
5.3.3 New Deal for Young People (NDYP) 
The NDYP was enacted in January 1998 by the newly elected Labour 
government as an active and compulsory labour market measure targeting young 
people (18-24) who had been entitled to the jobseekers‟ allowance for at least 6 
months
8
 (Wilkinson, 2003).  
 
Ideational dimension 
If the Conservatives stressed the importance to move people off benefits with the 
JSA, Labour‟s parole was just as strongly in favour of compulsory activation, 
improved work ethic of the young generation and of „deserving‟ and 
„undeserving‟ with the New Deal (HC Deb 1997c). The compulsory element of 
the NDYP along with the extended conditionality of benefits that the Secretary 
of Employment and Labour leadership in the Work Committee strongly 
proposed continued the road from „welfare to workfare‟ (HC Deb 1997c), which 
some Labour members had opposed in 1995. The improvement of the young 
persons‟ employability was a central theme of Labour‟s arguments and 
justification for the rather large costs of the NDYP (Departmental report, 1998; 
Employment Committee, 1997). The main conflict of interest between the two 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
8
 The programme is essentially divided into three periods, with the Gateway stage initially during which the 
young get intense help from job centres with job seeking, a second Options phase following after six months 
with enrolment in trainings, education programmes, subsidized work in the voluntary or environmental sector 
(Wilkinson, 2003). 
  49 
major parties concerned the magnitude of the budget and the disputed efficiency 
of government subsidised training schemes and jobs within the voluntary and 
private sector (HC Deb 1997a). Many Conservative politicians expressed a 
concern about the short-term nature of the training positions that the 
subsidization would cover, and argued that only the market forces could create 
long-term employment for the young (HC Deb 1997a; 1997b). 
 
Organizational dimension 
The incorporation of multiple actors, both in the implementation process but also 
in the policymaking and intended job-provision, was a paramount theme among 
the Labour leadership (Employment Committee, 1997). This, since jobs, 
apprenticeships and training positions were intended both for the voluntary 
sector through subsidies and through sponsoring private actors employing 
jobless youths. However there would be no bonus or premium for such 
employers, the Secretary of Employment guaranteed, but rather a compensation 
for the training costs and not more (Employment Committee, 1997; HC Deb 
1997c). The reform of the PES was, too, at the heart of the matter of the New 
Deal, and some Conservatives expressed a concern over the magnitude of the 
reform and the capacity of the PES to transform “from a harsh benefit regime 
into a caring and helping service” (Education and Employment Committee, 
1997).  
 
Financial dimension 
As the economic times in the UK were good, Labour expressed no intentions to 
hold back the budget, which they argued that the Conservatives had done with 
the JSA efforts, and large sums were proposed and disbursed on this active 
labour market programme (Education and Employment Committee, 1997).  
5.3.4 The Young Person‟s Guarantee (YPG) 
Ideational dimension 
The new Labour government launched the YPG in January 2010 as a 
continuation and refinement of the NDYP from 1998. With the Great recession 
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breathing the incumbent government in the neck, along with booming youth 
unemployment rates, the Labour leadership moved to argue for increased 
spending to counter the hikes in youth joblessness while development the 
provision of training and apprenticeships programmes (HC Deb 2009b; 2010c). 
The Conservative opposition worried, aside from the similarities with the 
NDYP, which many considered a failure, about the short-term nature of many of 
the contracts that would ensue from the new youth employment programme (HC 
Deb 2010b). The focus and emphasis from Labour was, on the contrary, to get 
the unemployment rates down swiftly, and not shying for short-term 
arrangements (HC Deb 2009b; 2010a). Some Labour representatives expressed a 
worry about the increased flexibility that would tax the young jobseekers (HC 
Deb 2010a), but all in all it was regarded as a necessary evil to get the 
employment rates up. Further improvements and refinements of the job support 
and personal guidance offered by the PES were proposed by the Labour 
leadership, as a mean to accommodate the job-seeking youth with sufficient 
service to match them with jobs (HC 2010c; 2009b). Thus, intending to balance 
the increased conditionality baked into the programme with personal backing 
and counselling (HC Deb 2009a).  
 
Organizational dimension 
Similar to the NDYP measure, the Labour leadership sought to incorporate many 
actors in the YPG programme; in order to secure the positions needed to 
“guarantee” the jobless youths‟ activation (HC Deb 2009b). Some Labour 
representatives even worried about the “less efficient and more costly public 
employers”, as a way to highlight the benefits of private employers (HC Deb 
2010b). This is a route that was well received by the Conservatives too, but 
perhaps with an emphasis on the increased room to manoeuvre for the private 
sector actors and on letting the incentives steer their job creation rather than top-
down government employment policy (HC Deb 2010b).  
 
Financial dimension 
In a similar manner as during the NDYP negotiations, Labour fought hard for a 
generous and large-scale activation budget, which the leadership in employment 
issues believed to be the remedy for high youth unemployment rates (HC Deb 
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2009b), and the Conservatives opposed this extensive budget in all essential. 
Drawing on the increased unemployment rates following the last year, before 
and after the Great recession, many Conservatives expressed concern and 
disbelief regarding increased government expenditure and suggested budget 
cuts, tax breaks and other deregulations for the private sector (HC Deb 2009b). 
5.3.5 Work Programme (WP) 
Ideational dimension 
The essence of the WP, brought to the fore by the newly elected Conservative 
coalition government in 2011, was to turn around the high youth unemployment 
numbers that had not decreased during the previous parliaments. This would be 
done by making it more costly to be unemployed for the young and simpler to 
hire young for the private employers (HC Deb 2010d). These were the 
Conservatives‟ ideas behind the programme, together with increased flexibility 
and financial incentives for both private employers and private or non-profit 
employment services to make an effort to hire young people (HC Deb 2011a). 
However, the Conservatives were clear on not just giving „hand outs‟ to the 
private employers for taking on young, but requiring counter-performance in the 
shape of continued employment of the young (HC Deb 2011c).   
     Among some members of the Conservative leadership, it was the fuelling of 
“real” private sector jobs that would lead to lower youth unemployment rates in 
the long run rather than the Labour-favoured subsidised employments within the 
public sector (HC Deb 2011a). The proposed measure, which transcended the 
debates around private or public sector jobs, was apprenticeships (with Germany 
held as a model example) and coordinated educational efforts to target the young 
NEETs (HC Deb 2011a). Although, the favouring of apprenticeships as such 
was bipartisan.  
 
Organizational dimension 
The policies suggested and motivated by the Conservative leadership, with the 
launch of the WP, were built largely on the engagement of local actors; both 
employers, voluntary job agencies and councils, businesses, schools and 
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jobcentres, and their ability to contribute to the intended apprenticeship and 
training programme (HC Deb 2011a). The Labour opposition accused the 
government to rely too heavily on market forces to sway employers of all brands 
into hiring the young, and promoting a more comprehensive and need-sensible 
measure (HC Deb 2011a; 2011b).  
 
Financial dimension 
The Conservative government cut the youth employment budget significantly 
compared to earlier incumbents‟ efforts, arguing that the debt-burdened 
economy needed fuel; relaxed employment protection schemes and some 
financial incentives for the employers to hire was the recipe (HC Deb 2011a). 
From the Left, the criticism mostly entailed denunciations of funding cuts for the 
Future Jobs Fund, established under the YPG, which many Labour 
representatives regarded as a safe and efficient job creating measure (HC Deb 
2011a). Otherwise, the measure was relatively undisputed. 
5.4 Discussion and classification of the English 
youth unemployment policy motives 
In this section, I discuss the findings of the analysis of the youth employment 
programme motives in the UK, by the aid of the Analytical grid and the three 
dimensions.   
     In accordance with what the literature suggests to be a cross-temporal trend 
for the youth unemployment policy in the UK, the emphasis on activation and 
active measures that seek to move young people from idleness to employment, 
training, internships or voluntary work prevails over time, throughout economic 
hardship and across party-lines (Maguire, 2013). There has been a steady 
consolidation of activation strategies: making work pay and consequently 
compensation conditioned to the young persons‟ contributions to society through 
different work programmes. Similarly, the focus on the „individual‟s 
employability‟, as shown in Table 4, was in place in the debates preceding the 
JSA in 1995. It remained within the following youth employment programmes 
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throughout the time period, but adapting towards the end of the 2000s the 
ambition to reform the PES. The steady increase of the youth unemployment rate 
and the tangible disbelief and hesitation over the appropriate course of action 
among the central policymakers probably brought about the need for 
interventions in other areas, such as the PES, when few other things seemed to 
work. That, or simply using the allegedly failed measures of prior governments‟ 
to motivate the new strategies. This pattern emerges clearly from the 
parliamentary records studied along with the great divides and partisanship in 
multiple areas and dimensions of the Analytical grid. 
     One watershed between the Conservative and Labour governments that 
prevail regardless of economic cycles is the spending on youth ALMPs, where 
Labour proposed an extensive budget for the youth programme both in the „good 
years‟ around 1997 and in the bad years following the crisis in 2008/2009. 
Conversely, the Conservative governments in the beginning and the end of the 
studied time period sought to decrease the budgets and showed a disbelief in 
broad state interventions to solve the youth unemployment problem (vis-à-vis 
the market forces). Similarly, the intentions to balance the increased flexibility 
following the activation policies, that indeed transcends the party-lines, are clear 
with the Labour governments and absent with the Conservative. As for the issue 
of dominant regime legacy, where the hypothesis predicts an emphasis on 
economic independence of youth for Liberal regimes, that focus prevails over 
the studied period. Although, during the Labour era between 1997-2010, it is 
clear that the party leadership for youth unemployment issues paid attention to 
educational opportunity for the sake of the individual‟s chances at the current 
labour market and to be resilient to future changes in demand by the skills that 
they acquire through the programmes.   
     Concerning the organizational dimension in Table 4, the trends towards 
subsidization of and targeting of non-public employers as a way to share costs, 
decrease state-centricity and improving conditions for hiring young among 
private and voluntary sectors are unanimous. It is within this realm that both 
partisanship and external influence from economic cycles have mattered the 
least. 
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Table 4. Analytical grid for the 
UK JSA NDYP YPG WP
Labour market policy options
Incumbent government's 
intentions for public expenditures 
on youth employment
Decrease overall 
spending
Increase overall 
spending
No change from 
previous regime
Decrease overall 
spending
Incumbent government's intended 
goal for youth employment 
programme
Improve individual's 
employability
Improve individual's 
employability
Consolidate efforts 
both increasing 
employability and 
public employment 
services.
Consolidate efforts 
both increasing 
employability and 
public employment 
services.
Main purpose of youth 
employment programme outcome
Economic 
independence of 
youth
Economic 
independence of 
youth / Educational 
opportunity for the 
individual's 
development
Economic 
independence of 
youth / Educational 
opportunity for the 
individual's 
development
Economic 
independence of 
youth
Conditionality of benefits
Increased 
conditionality
Increased 
conditionality
Unaltered from 
previous regime.
Increased 
conditionality
Design of youth unemployment 
benefit system Flexibility
Balancing flexibility 
with security
Balancing flexibility 
with security Flexibility
Sector specificity of reform
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Main provider and administrator 
of employment service Public Public Public Public and private
Type of employer targeted Not applicable Public or non-profit
Public, private and 
non-profit
Public, private and 
non-profit
Level of centralization of main 
implementation of unemployment 
reform Regional Local Local Local
Subsidization
No subsidization of 
non-public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Number of actors included in the 
implementation of unemployment 
reform Few Several Several Several
Loci of expenditures Active Active Active Active
Response to financial hardship
Governments' 
intention to decrease 
funding for passive 
labour market 
measures Not applicable. 
Governments' 
intention to decrease 
funding for active 
labour market 
measures
Governments' 
intention to decrease 
funding for active 
and passive labour 
market measures
Ideational dimension
Organizational dimension
Financial dimension
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5.5 France 
5.5.1 A brief background on the youth labour market situation in 
France in the 1990s   
The financial crisis that swept over Europe in the early 1990s was felt in France 
too (Kieffer et al, 2006, p. 104), and the instability caused a displacement of 
many workers in the private as well as public sector, which hit young workers 
with little or substandard educational background the hardest. Fougere et al 
(2000) point to three main features of the youth labour market policies in France 
used to tackle the worrying trend that large parts of the young population 
experienced spells of unemployment. These were job creation in the public 
sector through employment subsidies, the promotion of training programmes in 
the private sector, and the reduction of labour costs for private companies in 
order to stimulate the hiring of young, unskilled workers. Massive and numerous 
active labour market schemes have been launched throughout the 1990s, 
whereas demand side measures oriented towards safeguarding a living wage in 
France has not addressed young people in particular. The remuneration for the 
young unemployed has been low during this period, with an allowance paid for 
programme participation that has rarely been higher than welfare benefit levels 
(Enjolras et al, 2000). Thus, despite the numerous political attempts to come to 
terms with the youth unemployment, the young population has experienced and 
still experience dire conditions in the school to work transitioning. 
5.5.2 Active preparation for Qualification and for Employment 
(PAQUE) 
Ideational dimension 
Prior to the launch of PAQUE in 1992, there were extensive discussions about 
how to manage the many young unemployed, which had begun to be a most 
pressing political issue. There was consensus between the blocks about 
prolonging the state-subsidized solidarity employments (CES) for young people 
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in the aftermaths of the Gulf war and ERM crisis, which severely affected the 
unemployment rates. The Socialist Minister of Labour expressed his wish to 
render the state-subsidised employments redundant with PAQUE as a large-scale 
vocational initiative (Compte rendu intégral (CRI), 1991). Many politicians on 
the Right, though, were concerned that the apprenticeship and internship system 
would not lead to employment as expected, and the Minister of Labour 
emphasized a solution where the social partners (trade unions and employers‟ 
associations) would collaborate more closely to facilitate the route to 
employment (Ibid). Furthermore, the gradual lowering of the replacement rate 
that PAQUE entailed testifies to the government‟s inclination to thin out the 
benefit, albeit not to the same extent as proposed by the Right (Ibid). The 
Socialist government, thus, clearly took a step in the activation direction.  
     The Conservative Deputy of the Culture, Family and Social Commission 
expressed discontent with PAQUE, on his and the Right wing‟s behalf, and of its 
strong defence of employment protection at the budgetary expense of closing the 
ties between education, vocational training and employment (Avis no. 2946). 
The Socialist government was also criticized of being overly concerned with 
“forcing out job opportunities from the employers” instead of trying to adapt the 
young jobseekers to the demands of the labour market, by the Right opposition 
(Avis no. 2946). On a later occasion (CRI, 1992), the Minister of Labour stated 
the intention to ameliorate both supply and demand side of the youth 
unemployment issue, meaning both that the young needed better qualifications, 
the employers needed to make space for these young people and the PES and 
social partners needed to help allocating the young to an appropriate vacancy. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that parts of the Right wing advocated for 
the inclusion of young in the social welfare benefit RMI (CRI, 1992). The 
Socialist minister of Labour held, interestingly, that it would be more fruitful to 
let the monetary incentive of earning an allowance through PAQUE 
participation remain unaltered by this benefit (Ibid).  
 
Organizational dimension 
The Socialist government argued for a less centralised PES adaptable to 
structural changes that would not be contingent on economic cycles (CRI, 1991). 
They also argued that it was necessary of the PES and social partners to help the 
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unqualified “crossroad youths” at risk of falling into long-term unemployment 
and social exclusion if they were not offered employment. The Liberal deputy, 
along with the rest of the Commission for Social affairs, agreed with the 
Minister of Labour that more actors and better coordination were necessary and 
benevolent measures in order to reach the most vulnerable youths (Avis no. 
2946).  
      The state was the sole funder of the PAQUE and lump sums were given to 
private companies as well as public providers who hired young apprentices or 
interns (Avis no. 2946). The local missions and regional PES centres were given 
larger responsibility for setting up the groundwork for the PAQUE initiative.  
 
Financial dimension 
There was no decrease in spending in response to the financial hardship, but 
rather an emphasis from the Socialist government on active measures vis-à-vis 
measures prior to PAQUE (Aeberhardt et al, 2011). The Conservative 
opposition, however, opposed large spending with the argument that it would 
distort the labour market and deepen the national debt (CRI, 1991). 
5.5.3 New Services for Youth Employment (NSEJ) 
Ideational dimension 
The NSEJ targeted the young, inactive people without qualifications (Avis no. 
2271; CRI, 1996). The goal expressed by the Conservative leadership on 
employment was two-fold: vocational training for the individuals‟ development 
and future success and the adaptation of the labour supply of the technical 
demands of the labour market (Avis no. 2271). The Minister of Labour 
confirmed the necessity to spur growth and create good conditions for 
companies to hire and prosper, rather than forcing them to take on trainees and 
apprenticeships at their own expense (CRI, 1997a). The Communist wing of the 
parliament strongly disagreed with the government‟s new policies and criticized 
the “pampering of companies” through cut fees and taxes and insufficient tools 
to create stable and non-precarious jobs and thus creating a “generation of 
interns” (CRI, 1997a). The conflict of interests was very visible as the 
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Conservative government strongly believed in the virtues of an “apprenticeship 
system similar to that in Germany” and its formative qualities for the young as 
well as the demand-oriented needs for the industries and employers (Ibid). Parts 
of the Left wing agreed that industries needed a stimulus but they also 
emphasized the need to protect employment from “flexibility-oriented and 
liberalizing wave coming from the Maastricht Treaty” and permeating the 
French employment policy (CRI, 1997a; 1997b; 1996). Overall, the 
Conservatives strongly favoured economic independence for the “inactive” 
young, as opposed to the state‟s responsibility to create the opportunity for them 
to access education and get employed.  
 
Organizational dimension 
The “multitude of actors” (Avis no. 2271) involved in the youth employment 
process was too large and complicated, the Conservatives held, and the state‟s 
role as the regulator needed to be made clearer but also that further 
decentralization steps were needed. For example, that companies should design 
the apprenticeships to fit their needs, since they financed the apprenticeships 
from their own payroll (Avis no. 2271).  
 
Financial dimension 
The Conservative government insisted that the spending had been too low on 
apprenticeships and vocational training measures that it needed to increase (CRI, 
1995).  However, a larger part of this spending was derived from tax breaks 
given to companies as an incentive to hire youths and not on state-subsidized 
apprenticeships (Avis no. 2271). The government proposed cuts in remuneration 
for those enrolled in upcoming youth labour market programmes and cuts in 
social charges for the companies who hire young apprentices and trainees (CRI, 
1996).  
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5.5.4 Emergency plan for youth employment (PU)9 
Ideational dimension 
In budget discussions in the year following the global financial crisis many of 
the incumbent Conservative politicians in the concerned commissions mentioned 
the need to restrain the budget, cut passive measures and stimulate youth 
employment through the active measures of the Plan d‟Urgence (PU) (CRI, 
2008). The Socialist opposition, however, criticized the government for cutting 
too much and not spending enough on educational and vocational measures 
protecting the unqualified, unemployed youth from social exclusion and poverty 
(CRI, 2008). The lion part of the budget for youth labour market policy was 
earmarked for apprenticeships through tax breaks and premiums for hiring 
apprentices offered to the employers (CRI, 2008). The conditions for 
remuneration for the young was contingent on the participation in a programme, 
as an apprentice, trainee or intern, although many companies were paying 
salaries to apprentices which is an argument that the Conservative governments 
used to favour the apprenticeship system rather than the state-subsidized jobs 
(Question No. 1141). The stimulation of the market was perceived as a way to 
create economically independent individuals, coupled with the conditionality for 
remuneration at the participation in the PU measures (CNLE, 2010).  
 
Organizational dimension 
After years of letting the local missions be the point of coordination for the 
allocation of jobs and support for young jobseekers, the Conservative lead by the 
Minister of Labour suggested a re-entry of the regional PES offices for the sake 
of clarity and comprehension (CRI, 2008). In the policy deliberations for this 
measure, private employment agencies were brought in as a viable option to 
allocate jobseekers and the job openings, or indeed the apprenticeship positions 
(Ibid).  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9
 Other budget discussions than that of employment and work did not include the issue of young people without 
employment or any complementary measures for the deliberations in November 2008. The parliamentary 
material for this reform is therefore a little less comprehensive than for the other reforms, a fact that I try to make 
up for by including more questions and answers to the Minister in the analysis. 
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Financial dimension 
For the PU and the employment budget consecrated to youth unemployment 
policies for the fiscal year 2009, there were significant cuts to the passive 
measures such as state-subsidized employment and second chance educational 
programmes (Aeberhardt et al, 2011). But there was also a continued emphasis 
on apprenticeship slots for the young and the “stimulation” of such positions 
through tax cuts for the employers (Question No. 60466; Question No. 61176).  
5.5.5 Youth Guarantee (YG) 
Ideational dimension 
For the fiscal year of 2014, the Socialist government through the Minister of 
Youth, Sports and Education prescribed higher spending on the youth 
unemployment policy to come to terms with the ever-increasing unemployment 
rates in the wake of the financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the budget cuts from 
the PU in 2009 (CRI, 2013a). The coordination of and job support for the young 
unemployed was suggested to be re-oriented to the PES (CRI, 2013a). Another 
aspect of the GJ was the possibility of acquiring EU funding from their Youth 
Guarantee project, launched in 2012, which could be used to create 
apprenticeships and other forms of activities for young people in regions hit hard 
by youth unemployment (higher rates than 25 per cent). This was a goal that the 
Socialist government obviously aimed for, at least in part, with the GJ (Q. No 
40636; Q. No 42691). In the budget discussions for 2014, the Socialist 
representatives claimed to seek the overarching goal of stable employments for 
the young rather than “short-term measures just to improve the statistics” (CRI, 
2013b).   
    In terms of conditionality, the attendance and performance request was still 
included and proposed from the Socialist government and not particularly 
disputed from either the radical Left or the Right wings (CRI, 2013a). The 
Socialist Minister of Social affairs and Health held that the remuneration would 
be equal in size with the minimum benefits and require counter-performance 
from the young (Q. No 31019). However, parts of the budget suggested by the 
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Socialist government were dedicated to improve benefit rates, which was 
criticized by some representatives from the Right as a too costly measure (CRI, 
2013b).  
 
Organizational dimension 
In the deliberations on the local level about how to best match and best reach out 
to the young people in the most need of support and service, the inclusion of and 
communication with a multitude of actors was proposed and supported by the 
Right-wing as well as the Socialist government. The idea was to not induce a 
top-down, “populist” measure but rather anchor it well among the practitioners, 
the Minister of Youth, Sports and Education expressed (CRI, 2013a).  
 
Financial dimension 
The Socialist government suggested that the sharp cut in the financing of active 
and employer-oriented measures such as tax-cuts for apprenticeship and trainee 
positions: an intervention that representatives from the Right-wing opposition 
strongly disagreed with (CRI, 2013a; 2013b). Representatives of the Right-wing, 
both from the Conservative and Centre-Right parties, expressed a fear of driving 
the country into debt and creating strong disincentives for companies to hire 
young people in the budget deliberations for 2014 (CRI, 2013b).  In a speech by 
the Prime minister in April 2014, however, the government reversed their 
positions on the cuts of social charges for the companies and reintroduced the 
idea of a better and more business-friendly policy, along with decreased salaries 
for the young workers (CRI, 2013a). 
5.6 Discussion and classification of the French 
youth unemployment policy motives 
In Table 5, the results of the motivation analysis of the parliamentary 
deliberations, Committee reports and other statements from key policymakers 
involved in the youth unemployment reforms are presented. Notably, there are 
some motivations, arguments and ideas that are recurring throughout the time 
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period and transcending both the changing economic times, with financial crises 
hitting France during PAQUE, PU and to some extent also GJ: a fact that is 
present in the discussions around these programmes. The inclusion of several 
actors, the relatively recurring increase in youth labour market policy spending 
as well as the targeting of both public and private employers are proposed by the 
incumbent governments throughout the period, regardless of party or ideological 
belonging, along with the favouring of active measures.  
     Turning to the primary goals for the delivery of reform and the governments‟ 
intentions to demark the individuals vis-à-vis the institutions‟ need to adapt in 
order to mitigate the mass youth unemployment problem, it is notably stable 
except for the years 1996-1997. This was during the NSEJ negotiations, when 
the government took the view that it was the young people that needed to 
become more employable. It was also around this time that the talk of flexibility, 
the loosening of salary protection and rigid employment contracts depart and is 
exacerbated in the PU, when large parts of the labour policy in general was 
permeated by ideas of flexibility (see Pickard, 2014; Aeberhardt et al, 2011). 
However, the financial hardships that struck France twice did not have the 
expected effect on overall expenditures, with the exception of the two last 
governments on the Right and Left-wing respectively favouring the active versus 
the passive measures. These actions must be seen in the context of the levels that 
previous reforms and youth unemployment budgets had set, which is 
underpinning the reactions of the political actors on both sides in their favouring 
or disfavouring of the new measures. Likewise, the matter of the idea behind the 
reform and what values it sought to illuminate seems relatively contingent on 
partisanship, while at the same time preserving the Employment-centred regime 
core value of “vocational qualification”, suggested in Hypothesis 2. Rather than 
changing course radically, in neither of the dimensions or operational indicators, 
the intentions guiding the French youth unemployment regime over time have 
the look of layering, which Streeck and Thelen determine as one possible form 
and feature of policy change and convergence pattern (2005), where new 
institutions are layered on top of the already existing ones.  
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Table 5. Analytical grid for 
France PAQUE NSEJ PU GJ
Labour market policy options
Incumbent government's 
intentions for public expenditures 
on youth employment
Increase overall 
spending
Increase overall 
spending
No change in budget 
from prior year
Increase overall 
spending
Incumbent government's intended 
goal for youth employment 
programme
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing 
employability and 
public employment 
services.
Improve indivudual's 
employability
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing 
employability and 
public employment 
services.
Consolidate efforts both 
increasing employability 
and public employment 
services.
Main purpose of youth 
employment programme outcome
Vocational qualification 
to accommodate the 
industry and the 
indivudual / 
Educational opportunity 
for the individual's 
development
Vocational 
qualification to 
accommodate the 
industry and the 
individual / Economic 
independence of youth
Vocational qualification 
to accommodate the 
industry and the 
individual / Economic 
independence of youth
Vocational qualification 
to accommodate the 
industry and the 
indivudual / Educational 
opportunity for the 
individual's development
Conditionality of benefits Not discussed Not discussed
Increased conditionality 
of benefits suggested Not discussed
Design of youth unemployment 
benefit system Security
Balancing flexibility 
with security Flexibility
Balanced flexibility with 
security
Sector specificity of reform
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Industry sector 
favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Other or no specific 
sector favoured
Main provider and administrator 
of employment service Public Public Both public and private Public
Type of employer targeted Both public and private Both public and private Both public and private Both public and private
Level of centralization of main 
implementation of reform Regional Local Regional Regional
Subsidization
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Subsidization of non-
public employers
Number of actors included in the 
implementation of unemployment 
reform Several Several Several Several
Loci of expenditures Active measures Active measures Active measures
Both active and passive 
measures
Response to financial hardship No decrease Not applicable
Governments' intention 
to decrease funding for 
passive labour market 
measures
Decrease in funding for 
active labour market 
measures
Ideational dimension
Organizational dimension
Financial dimension
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6 Youth unemployment policy 
motives: The comparative perspective 
In this chapter, I compare the three countries and the cross-temporal changes that 
the motives of the youth employment programmes have undergone. Drawing on 
the five hypotheses, I highlight the main findings and reiterate to the theoretical 
framework in order to interpret the results and to answer the research question:  
 
- To what extent have Sweden, the UK and France’s governments’ formation of 
programmes targeting youth unemployment converged or diverged between 
1990-2014? 
6.1 Hypothesis 1: Modern welfare states‟ responses 
to periods of economic downturns 
Hypothesis 1. At periods of economic downturns, modern welfare states’ 
governments argue for the decrease of funding for passive youth unemployment 
measures (benefit duration and generosity of benefits).  
 
In the case of Sweden, the first hypothesis holds since the governments during 
the 1990s crisis, the Great recession and the years after decreased the funding for 
passive measures. Although, in 2011 spending on active measures was 
increasingly promoted. This is coupled with the increased conditionality of 
benefits that transcends both party politics and economic cycles. In the UK, the 
results are more ambiguous at the end of the period. This was when the Left 
government left the passive measures unaltered, but suggested increased active 
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measures in 2009, whereas the Right-wing government cut funding for both 
types in 2011.  
     It seems as if partisanship matters more in the English case than in the 
Swedish, notwithstanding the fact that the reforms are rather synchronized. Even 
more ambiguous is the support for Hypothesis 1 when we consider the French 
case, as the Left-wing government in the early 1990s maintained their spending 
level on passive measures but the Right-wing government significantly cut this 
funding. Later, in the most current GJ reform, it was the spending on active 
labour market measures that the parliamentary majority wanted to decrease: not 
the passive.   
      Considering these results, it is not relevant to talk about a very strong 
liberalisation trend that would predict retrenchments in the face of financial 
austerity or instability across different welfare regimes. Neither are the unifying, 
harmonizing patterns among policymakers within the youth unemployment 
domain with relation to the (de-)commodification of benefit generosity or 
duration through economic drivers persistent, contrary to Drezner‟s predictions 
(2001). Although the Liberal and Employment-centred countries in this study 
have proven to not adhere to the path staked out by the mechanisms of regime 
stability and continuity (Rothstein – Steinmo, 2002, pp. 95-101), we can not rule 
out that the Universalistic Sweden have undergone change in this regard 
(Streeck – Thelen, 2005). 
6.2 Hypothesis 2: Different welfare states‟ main 
purposes for youth employment outcomes 
Hypothesis 2. Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives 
for the youth employment programmes: 
2a: Liberal youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize economic 
independence of the young in the formation of youth unemployment policies. 
2b: Universalistic youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize the 
provision of educational opportunity. 
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2c: Employment-centred youth transition regimes’ governments emphasize 
vocational qualification in the formation of the youth unemployment policies. 
 
This hypothesis juxtaposes the youth transition regime theory and the policy 
convergence theory and prompts the rather unanimous support for the one or the 
other theoretical postulate, in relation to the intended overall purpose that the 
national policymakers had in mind for the programmes. The results from the 
within-case analysis are interesting in their diversity of results. Granted that all 
three countries “started out” in the early 1990s with purposes that adhered to 
their different, regime-specific legacies, all have proven to take on, or layer 
(Streeck – Thelen, 2005), another regime‟s purpose on their own. Like Lødemel 
discusses, in his work on convergence in youth unemployment policy, the push-
factors from liberalism and globalisation coupled with the increased EU 
engagement in youth employment issues enable countries to take on new ideas, 
although not necessarily through the same routes (2000, pp. 308-314).  
     The preferences among the Swedish policymakers in this regard have 
expanded to not only entail “educational opportunity” but also the values of 
“vocational qualification to accommodate the industry and individual” over time 
and over two consecutive youth reforms. Conversely, the French policy 
preferences have over time grown to adopt the Universalistic programme 
purpose “educational opportunity” alongside of the Employment-centred regime 
“vocational qualification”, notably during the Left-wing governments. However, 
during both Right-wing mandate periods, the Liberal “economic independence” 
was layered on top of “vocational qualification”.  
     Thus, France has shown a propensity to alter its approaches, while retaining 
the Employment-centred focus all along, but the trend has not been univocal. 
The patterns in the UK follow those in France in terms of the Left-wing 
government‟s preference for the „Universalistic way‟ with “educational 
opportunity‟, but without the adaptation of Employment-centred vocational 
goals for the Right-wing governments. It could be argued, thus, that of any 
regime it is the Universalistic that has prevailed in other cases than in its original 
regime context: Sweden. Other than that, it must be concluded that regime 
legacy along with party politics seems to play a more dominant role than 
convergence streams in this aspect. However, the case for uni-modal change, 
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conceptualized by Streeck and Thelen (2005) is supported empirically through 
this indicator.   
     Considering the other goal-oriented indicator for the governments youth 
employment programmes, however more related to party politics and 
preferences than youth transition regime legacy, a most univocal change in all 
three countries from efforts to „improve employability‟ towards „consolidating 
efforts both increasing employability and the PES‟. This finding, I believe, 
speaks to the increased complexity and imminence of the youth unemployment 
problem and the experienced difficulties among the national governments to 
focus „just‟ on purely demand or supply side efforts. Or, it may be that  
policymakers‟ experienced difficulties of simply knowing how to come to terms 
with the problem through political initiatives. Nevertheless, it is a finding that 
supports the occurrence of convergence, at least in this aspect, and questions 
McNeish and Loncle‟s study of the European direction of labour market policy 
goals for young people (2003, p. 111). 
6.3 Hypothesis 3: Youth transition regimes and 
benefit and employment policy system configurations 
Hypothesis 3. Youth transition regimes matter for the governments’ objectives 
for the formation of benefit systems for the young unemployed.  
3a: Universalistic and Employment-centred (high-committed) countries suggest 
security measures or balanced flexibility and security measures for the young 
unemployed. 
3b: Liberal (low-committed) countries favour flexibility measures at the expense 
of security or balanced flexibility and security measures for the young 
unemployed. 
 
We move on to the question that relates to the employment benefit system and 
policy incentives to counter high youth unemployment rates, and which seeks to 
unfold the activation and liberalisation movement that the theoreticians of 
globalisation, youth transition regimes as well as labour market policy change 
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predict (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 111-112). The results here are ambiguous 
at best from the three countries studied. In Sweden, it seems like it is the 
financial circumstances in the world that prompted arguments in favour of 
increased flexibility in the JDG reform, whereas the maintenance of balance 
between flexibility and security prevailed after the Great recession. In all 
essential, Sweden stays true to its high-committed, Universalistic heritage. The 
UK governments, on the other hand, follow the party lines as the emphasis on 
balance flexibility and security vis-à-vis flexibility shifts with their placement on 
the Left/Right scale. Similar trends are found in the French majorities‟ motives, 
although a slight shift from the initial focus on security towards the latter 
emphasis on flexibility or balanced flexibility and security. This, considering 
France‟s ranking among the high-committed countries, does not lend support to 
the third hypothesis or to the overall youth transition regime‟s theoretical 
keynotes on the matter (McNeish – Loncle, 2003, pp. 111-122). Thus, support 
for Hypothesis 3 cannot be found in this study, and I believe that a more in-
depth inquiry of the motives used in related fields such as social security debates 
would have had been necessary in order to fully explore the implications of this 
hypothesis.  
6.4 Hypothesis 4 and 5: Party politics and 
propensity for spending and subsidization 
Hypothesis 4. Government placement on the Left/Right political scale matters 
for youth employment spending propensity: 
4a: Left-wing governments increase overall spending on youth unemployment 
policies. 
4b: Right-wing governments decrease overall spending on youth unemployment 
policies. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Government placement on the Left/Right political scale matters 
for subsidization of non-public employers: 
5a. Left-wing governments prefer no subsidization of non-public employers.  
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5b: Right-wing governments prefer subsidization of non-public employers.  
 
Since these two hypotheses are somewhat interrelated and adhere to similar 
theoretical perspectives, I choose to discuss them together. Starting with the 
general question of party-contingent spending levels over time on youth 
employment measures, this hypothesis finds its strongest support in the Swedish 
case. Whereas the first 1990s reform, carried out under Conservative auspices, 
involved cuts of overall spending, the subsequent Social Democratic government 
turned the ship around and argued for higher labour market spending. However, 
this trend prevailed even with the following Right-wing government, which 
indicates that the bar has been set for high spending in Sweden regardless of 
ideology. In the UK, the party politics argument holds water, since the Left- and 
Right-wing governments respectively argued for increased and decreased 
spending. The French case, on the other hand, shows no contingency on party 
politics but rather persistently argues for increased or high spending across party 
lines. This trend is not as visible in for the subsidization variable, as all 
governments have allowed for subsidization of non-public employers throughout 
the period. In the UK and in Sweden, the trend is similar with the persistence of 
subsidization towards the end of the studied period. Although, in the Swedish 
case there was only one Social Democrat-led reform which somewhat weakens 
the robustness of the results.   
     All in all, the results related to the first hypothesis do not support the 
assumptions emanating from the policy change drivers discussed in 3.3 (idea 
proliferation and convergence patterns) other than for the case of the UK. For 
Sweden and France, there has rather been a movement towards the acceptance of 
high spending levels as one of the tools to counter the youth unemployment 
problem. Similarly, France and the UK have taken a comparable path regarding 
the promoting of subsidization for non-public employers, whereas Sweden‟s 
case supports the hypothesis of the importance of party politics. 
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6.5 The European influence 
Drawing on the national parliamentarians‟ motives and motivations in the 
debates, some findings that would indicate that the idea proliferating qualities of 
the all the more closely knitted European network of countries and epistemic 
communities are discovered. The EU Youth Guarantee mission in 2012 allocated 
money to projects that sought to give young people an offer of employment, 
internship and apprenticeship in all Europe. The Socialist Minister of Labour 
predicted that France could get about €600M from the EU Youth Guarantee for 
their YG project in 2013, which was followed by a broad consensus in 
parliament. Was this incentive perhaps strong enough to forge the three 
countries‟ national policies as of 2012? Comparing to Lødemel‟s postulates 
about policy diffusion and influence from the EU on the labour market policy 
developments in its member states (2000, pp. 306-308), the findings from my 
analysis of the debates fuel that thought. On similar notes, there are numerous 
English MPs that allude to the German example, as do the Swedish (also 
including Denmark) and French ones in their respective debates. Aside from 
these instances, there were no other explicit mentions of the EU or convergence 
pressures, but instead ideational drivers of learning from „best practice‟ 
examples and previous actions resulting from the two crises (Drezner, 2001; 
Bennett, 1991). Not only do policymakers in the different national contexts 
acknowledge other countries‟ successful policy solutions, but in many cases they 
also take the crucial steps towards the implementation of that solution in their 
own country. This, even if the traditional labour market policy legacy forces 
would hold them back, according to youth transition regime theory (McNeish – 
Loncle, 2003). Thus, even if a causal relationship can not be confirmed from this 
analysis, it is possible that the increased activity on EU level concerning the 
youth unemployment policy including increased interactions, ideational 
diffusion and cooperation that the European member states have undergone over 
the time period (Berthet, 2015, p. 45), has nudged the countries in a similar 
policy direction.  
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7 Concluding remarks and suggestions 
further research  
The allocation of expenditures on active rather than passive measures is the most 
obviously similar trend that the countries of all regime types are following. It 
seems like an irreversible path taken, and with the gradual increase of benefit 
conditionality (let alone across all different types of government compositions), 
it forms a strong argument for the existence and persistence of the activation turn 
in youth labour market policies.  
     Reviewing changes in the organizational dimension, the movement in both 
Sweden and the UK towards the subsidization of non-public employers (and the 
continued subsidization in France), as a supply side tax policy incentive is the 
most convincing sign of convergence within this dimension. The governments‟ 
active financing and inclusion of these actors in the overarching efforts to 
activate youth and increase the employment rates for this group signals the 
convergence of policy. Further, coupled with the inclusion of more actors in the 
implementation process of policies, it speaks to the growing importance 
governance modes of steering, through new partnerships and interaction between 
different actors with stakes in the labour market (Berthet, 2015, pp. 45-47).   
     Concluding the results from the ideational dimension, it is plain to see that 
regime type still matters to a broad extent in all three country-cases studied. 
There has not been proof of the qualified convergence, brought to bear by 
Streeck and Thelen (2005), of the motives and intentions for the overarching 
goals and purposes for the youth programmes designs and outcomes, which I set 
out to examine. However, the gradual shift towards a partial policy 
convergence, as both Sweden, the UK and France have shown evidence of 
within the areas of “intended goal for youth employment programme” and “main 
purpose of youth employment programme outcome” (Table 2), indicates the 
possibility of an on-going trend. Although we may not have arrived to a 
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common destination, or are going along shared policy routes, some aspects of 
youth unemployment policies in Europe might be headed in the same general 
direction. Still, there is little or nothing in this study indicating that youth 
unemployment policies in all its complexity would fully converge in any 
foreseeable future.  
     In this thesis, I have attempted to give a comprehensive image of how 
countries of different youth transition regime types have evolved, changed, 
converged and diverged over more than two decades. Inasmuch as the findings 
have pointed to a the importance of regime legacy in some labour market policy 
choices, party politics mattering for others and the occurrence of layering and 
partial convergence of third and forth areas, some questions remain unanswered 
whereas other new ones have arisen. In order to take the new insights gained 
from this study a step further, it is necessary to venture deeper into the causal 
mechanisms behind idea proliferation and ideational and economic drivers for 
convergence. Alternatively, testing the newfound claims on other cases or areas 
within the labour market policy sphere to ascertain or reassess their theoretical 
value. 
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